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INTRODUCTION
In the classic 1956 movie, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, alien
beings encased in plant pods kill people and assume their physical
forms. The resulting “pod people” are flat, one-dimensional
versions of their hosts, in stark contrast to the fully rounded,
nuanced human beings whose bodies they colonized. First
Amendment doctrine might seem far removed from such goingson,1 but in recent years a similarly mindless attack on First
Amendment common sense2 threatens to wreak havoc not just on
First Amendment doctrine but on government’s ability to enact
ordinary regulatory legislation that poses no threat to the values
the Speech Clause seeks to protect. Just like the pod people in the
movie, the reconstituted doctrine lacks the nuance and subtlety of
the older doctrine that it threatens to kill and replace with a
colorless one-dimensionality.
This attack comes in the form of the imposition of a strict
content-neutrality requirement3 in contexts where it does not make
sense. The most obvious recent example of this phenomenon is the
2015 case Reed v. Town of Gilbert,4 in which the Supreme Court held
that the facial content focus of a law sufficed to render such a law
formally “content-based,” with all the stringent judicial scrutiny
that label triggers—even in situations that pose no plausible threat
to First Amendment values. Certainly, Reed’s expansion of the
1. Nevertheless, this Article is not the first to analogize First Amendment doctrine to
science fiction or horror movie characters. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First
Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2015) (“[A] zombie free speech
jurisprudence: a body of doctrine robbed of its animating spirit of expressive equality and
enslaved in the service of economic power.”). Thanks to Kyle Langvardt for this pointer.
2. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (“We can administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common
sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its intended function.”).
3. Scholars often identify this strict rule disfavoring laws that regulate speech
differently depending on its content as the “content-neutrality rule.” See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan
III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 227 (1982) (identifying
as the “content neutrality” rule the rule from Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972),
that strongly disfavored laws that regulate speech differently based on its content). Today,
the content-neutrality rule takes the form of a requirement that content-based laws satisfy
what has come to be known as strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“Because the [California law challenged in that case] imposes a
restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate
that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest
and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”).
4. Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218.
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definition of content-discrimination is open to critiques, which
scholars have already begun to provide.5 Yet, as I discuss below,
Reed is in many ways the least objectionable example of the
invasion of the content-neutrality rule. Rather, the more significant
threat arises from cases endorsing a broader application of the rule
strongly disfavoring content-based laws.6
Two such cases stand out.7 First, in Sorrell v. IMS Health,8 the
Court struck down a Vermont statute that regulated the transfer of
physicians’ prescription history information to so-called detailers,
who sought to use that information for marketing purposes. The
Court treated that law as a regulation of commercial speech,9 a
category that is governed by a unique First Amendment test.10
Nevertheless, in applying that test, the Court expressed significant
concern in large part because the challenged law discriminated on
the basis of the content of the speech it regulated.11 As I argue
below, an approach to commercial speech regulation that focuses
on the content-based/content-neutrality question reflects either a
misunderstanding of foundational commercial speech doctrine or
a larger agenda to alter that doctrine by removing commercial
speech as a distinct category of First Amendment law.
Second, in the 2018 case National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),12 the Court struck down a California
5. See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127
YALE L.J. F. 150, 162 (2017) (“Commentators have noted that ‘the standard for deeming a
regulation content-based’ ‘divorces the content distinction from its intended purpose of
ferreting out impermissible government motive.’” (quoting Note, Free Speech Doctrine After
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1986 (2016))). For a defense of a stringent
content-neutrality/strict scrutiny rule, see, for example, Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for
Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1305 (2014).
“[I]n the confrontation between village tyrant [sic] and village Hampdens, a strong doctrine
requiring content neutrality has real virtues in the real world.” Id. For a more ambivalent
conclusion about Reed, see Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise
of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233 (2016).
6. See supra note 3 (identifying this rule as “the content neutrality rule”).
7. This Article focuses on recent expansions of the content-neutrality rule to new
contexts. However, such expansionism has been going on since at least the early 1990s. See
infra text accompanying notes 123–130.
8. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
9. Id. at 571.
10. See infra note 109 (setting forth that test).
11. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565 (“Act 80 is designed to impose a specific, content-based
burden on protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”).
12. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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law mandating the posting of abortion-availability and medicallicensing information in so-called crisis pregnancy centers.13 Such a
law appropriately triggers First Amendment scrutiny, consistent
with Supreme Court compelled speech jurisprudence dating back
seventy-five years.14 Yet, just like in Sorrell, the Court’s analysis in
NIFLA was remarkable for its explicit focus on the content-basis of
the regulation. If that focus does not seem remarkable, think again:
almost any law compelling speech necessarily draws content-based
distinctions by virtue of mandating that the coerced speaker mouth
a particular message.15 To be sure, a law could conceivably require
a person to say something, but leave the content of that speech
totally up to the speaker16 or a third party who is given access to the
regulated person’s facilities for use as a speech platform.17 But such
laws are outliers compared with the heartland of compelled speech
doctrine, which involves government compulsion of a particular
message.18 Thus, unless the Court intends to apply strict scrutiny to
nearly every law that compels speech, the invasion of the contentneutrality rule into the realm of compelled speech doctrine
constitutes at best an odd mismatch between situation and
doctrine. At worst, it suggests a near-per se prohibition on the vast
majority of laws compelling speech.19 An invasion, indeed.

13. See id. at 2368.
14. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
15. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making this point).
16. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)
(“The Solomon Amendment, unlike the laws at issue in [Barnette and Wooley], does not
dictate the content of the speech at all, which is only ‘compelled’ if, and to the extent, the
school provides such speech for other recruiters. There is nothing in this case approaching a
Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse.”).
17. For an example of such a content neutral law requiring a person to open up his or
her facilities for others to use as a speech platform, see PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980), which upheld a state law requiring owners of shopping centers to open
their facilities to other persons’ speech, regardless of the content of that speech.
18. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379, 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying
everyday government regulations that take the form of speech compulsions, acknowledging
the majority’s attempt to protect such regulations’ constitutionality, but concluding that the
majority’s attempt is inconsistent with NIFLA’s own facts and at any rate is sufficiently vague
as to create uncertainty and invite litigation).
19. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (“In the ordinary case
it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content based and, in practice, viewpoint
discriminatory.”).
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This Article examines the invasion of the content-neutrality rule
by first examining the most important recent cases that reflect that
invasion and then considering, in turn, the explanations for and
implications of that invasion. After Part I quickly summarizes the
basic doctrinal background, Parts II through IV of this Article
consider Reed, Sorrell, and NIFLA, each in turn. Part V considers
possible explanations for the invasion. Those explanations range
from the Court’s continued pro-business agenda,20 to the internal
logic of the content-neutrality rule,21 to a free speech romanticism
that endows every speech act with seemingly transcendent
importance.22 Part VI considers possible implications of the
invasion of the content-neutrality rule. It concludes that those
implications could stretch from lower court defiance of the invasion
to the implementation of major changes to foundational First
Amendment doctrines. Part VII concludes by briefly speculating
about the future course of this invasion. It identifies two remaining
areas—secondary effects doctrine and professional speech—that so
far remain unconquered but presumably vulnerable to attack.
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A foundational Speech Clause rule presumptively forbids
government from banning speech because of the message that
speech communicates.23 Scholars24 generally trace this rule to the
20. See infra Part V.A.
21. See infra Part V.B.
22. See infra Part V.C.
23. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); see also Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
413, 443 (1996) (“The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of
speech serves as the keystone of First Amendment law.”); Kreimer, supra note 5, at 1263 n.2
(2014) (citing scholars echoing the foundational nature of the content neutrality rule); Lee
Mason, Content Neutrality and Commercial Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 959 (2017) (“The distinction between content-neutral and content-based
speech first emerged in Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley.”). The
“presumptively” in the text statement reflects the fact that content-based laws sometimes do
survive, if they are held to satisfy strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S.
Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015) (“We have emphasized that ‘it is the rare case’ in which a State
demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. But
those cases do arise.” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992))).
24. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 232
(2012) (citing Mosley for the proposition that “[f]or forty years, the prohibition on content
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Court’s 1972 decision in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, and
in particular the Mosley Court’s statement that “above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”25 The rule responds to the basic instinct that speech
restrictions based on the content of the restricted message suggest
a government motive to skew the subjects and terms of public
debate,26 or at least provide a tool for censorship-minded
government officials.27 Given that instinct, it should be
unsurprising that inquiry into a speech restriction’s content-basis is
a fundamental part of any inquiry into its constitutionality.
This First Amendment principle is generally accepted, as is its
justification. But scholars and judges have divided on important
follow-on questions. Most relevantly for our purposes, they have
disagreed on the appropriate depth and scope of the contentneutrality idea. By “depth,” I mean both the force of any contentneutrality principle—for example, whether a content
discriminatory law automatically triggers strict judicial scrutiny—
and the definition of “content discrimination.” The concept of
“depth” thus speaks to how far down the content-neutrality
principle bores, in terms of both its effect on judicial review and its
very definition of the phenomenon (content discrimination) that

discrimination has been a touchstone of First Amendment law”); Stephan, supra note 3
(identifying “the new content neutrality rule [the Court] was announcing” in Mosley).
25. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. Ironically, the Court decided Mosley on an equal protection
ground. See id. at 94–95 (“Because Chicago treats some picketing differently from others, we
analyze this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). Relatedly, in a 1991 concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy traced back the
strict scrutiny requirement that is often associated with the content neutrality rule to a postMosley equal protection case, Carey v. Brown. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When
government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the
Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial
state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully
scrutinized.” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1980)); see also id. at 126 (quoting
Mosley’s “above all else” language).
26. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 23, at 445–50 (arguing that Free Speech doctrine,
including the content neutrality rule, reflects a search for invidious government motives).
27. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (“Innocent
[governmental] motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially
content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to
suppress disfavored speech.”). See also infra note 85 (quoting additional justifications for
strict scrutiny of content-based laws provided by the Court in NIFLA).
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triggers the resulting stringent level of scrutiny. By “scope,” I mean
the applicability of any doctrinal rule presumptively condemning
content-based speech restrictions to a given context—for example,
to commercial speech, an area that, at least currently, is governed
by a less stringent doctrinal rule.28 As this Article’s analysis will
make clear, these two concepts are closely related.
As Part II explains, in recent years the Court has provided a
seemingly definitive definition of content-neutrality that deepens
the impact of the content-neutrality rule, while simultaneously
insisting on a rigid form of strict scrutiny when reviewing a law it
deems content-based. As Parts III and IV of this Article
demonstrate, the Court has also been broadening the scope of the
content-neutrality rule to new areas. Both of these moves are
controversial and potentially troubling.
II. REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT:
DEEPENING THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY RULE
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,29 the Court considered a town’s
ordinance that imposed varying regulations of privately placed
signs on public property, depending in part on the message the sign
conveyed. In particular, the ordinance imposed differing size and
duration requirements for such signs, depending on their content.30
A unanimous Court struck the ordinance down. However, the
Justices fractured in their reasoning. Six Justices, speaking through
Justice Thomas, held that the ordinance triggered strict scrutiny
under the content-neutrality rule because it drew facial distinctions
based on the content of the message a given sign conveyed.31 In
28. See infra note 109 (setting forth the current test for commercial speech restrictions);
infra note 74 (citing one Justice’s description of that test as “intermediate scrutiny”); see also
infra Part III (discussing the applicability of the content neutrality rule to commercial speech
restrictions). Indeed, in an earlier case, the Court expanded the content neutrality rule to
speech that is often described as lacking First Amendment protection entirely. See R.A.V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). R.A.V. is discussed in more detail infra, text accompanying notes
123–130.
29. Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218.
30. See id. at 2224–25 (explaining the ordinance’s distinctions and providing the
examples, from the town’s official code, of the categories of “ideological” signs, “political”
signs, and “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event,” each of which was
subject to different size and duration requirements).
31. Id. at 2227 (“On its face, the Sign Code is a content-based regulation of speech. We
thus have no need to consider the government’s justifications or purposes for enacting the
Code to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”).
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doing so, the Court held that laws that draw facial distinctions are
necessarily “content-based” as the Court’s free speech doctrine
understands that term.32
Thus, the Court rejected the lower court’s conclusion,
supported by the United States as an amicus,33 that Court precedent
had defined “content-based” laws solely as those “that cannot be
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”34
The Court acknowledged that such laws were also “content-based”
as the Court uses that term.35 However, the Court in Reed
supplemented that definition with what it described as “the crucial
first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether
the law is content neutral on its face.”36 Given that the town’s
ordinance drew facially content-based lines, the Court subjected it
to strict scrutiny which, unsurprisingly, it failed.37
The Court provided relatively little in the way of a justification
for this rule, other than its asserted consistency with the Court’s
prior cases.38 It did, however, provide the following explanation for
32. For a comparison of Reed’s embrace of a facial classification rule in the speech
context to its similar embrace of a facial classification rule in the equal protection context, see
Lakier, supra note 5.
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Reed, 135 S.
Ct. 2218 (No. 13-502), 2014 WL 4726504.
34. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227; see id.at 2227–28 (rejecting the lower court’s argument). See
also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e . . . noted [in an earlier
case] the Supreme Court’s advice that ‘laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based,’ and
that a ‘speech restriction is content neutral if it is justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech.’” (quoting Foti v. Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1998))),
rev’d, 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015); id. at 1071 (“As we have repeatedly explained, government
regulation of expressive activity is ‘content neutral’ if it is justified without reference to the
content of regulated speech.” (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000))).
35. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227; see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2308, 2314
(2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing this definition of
content discrimination).
36. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
37. Indeed, the town’s ordinance, which regulated the legal size and duration of signs
placed on private property based on the message the sign conveyed, failed even the more
generous scrutiny the dissenters would have provided. See id. at 2236, 2239 (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (“The Town of Gilbert’s defense of its sign ordinance—most notably, the law’s
distinctions between directional signs and others—does not pass strict scrutiny, or
intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.”).
38. See id. at 2228 (majority opinion) (“[W]e have repeatedly considered whether a law
is content neutral on its face before turning to the law’s justification or purpose.” (citing Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011), United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315
(1990), Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984), Clark v.
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its rejection of the idea that only content-based government intent
mattered to the content-neutrality inquiry:
Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship
presented by a facially content-based statute, as future
government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress
disfavored speech. That is why the First Amendment expressly
targets the operation of the laws—i.e., the “abridg[ement] of
speech”—rather than merely the motives of those who
enacted them.39

The three remaining Justices agreed that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, but on very different grounds.40 Justices Kagan
and Breyer each wrote concurring opinions41 that criticized the
majority’s invocation of the content-neutrality rule, and in
particular its holding that strict scrutiny applies in each and every
case considering a law that draws a facially content-based speech
distinction.42 Both opinions recognized that the strict scrutiny that
applies to content-based regulations plays an important role in
promoting core First Amendment values.43 But they questioned
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984), and United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 375, 377 (1968))). The concurring opinion of Justice Kagan disputed this reading of
the Court’s cases. See id. at 2238–39 (Kagan, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2229 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend
I). A sizable literature considers the question whether subjective intent, ex post justification,
or simply effects should determine whether a law should be considered content based for
First Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional
Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 362 (1997); Kagan, supra note 23. This Article does not engage
that normative argument, as its focus is to consider what Reed’s broader definition of
content discrimination means for First Amendment doctrine, particularly in light of Sorrell
and NIFLA.
40. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.)
(arguing that the Court should have struck the ordinance down based simply on its breadth).
See also infra note 41 (citing Justice Breyer’s concurrence).
41. Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.).
42. See, e.g., id. at 2236–38 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“We apply strict scrutiny to facially
content-based regulations of speech, in keeping with the rationales just described, when
there is any ‘realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.’ . . . But when that
is not realistically possible, we may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely reasonable’
laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive.” (first quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ.
Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007); and then quoting id. at 2231 (majority opinion))).
43. See id. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“This
Court’s decisions articulate two important and related reasons for subjecting content-based
speech regulations to the most exacting standard of review. The first is ‘to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’ The second is to
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whether every single instance of a content-based distinction
implicated those values. For example, Justice Kagan cited another
city’s ordinance that allowed residents to illuminate only signs
identifying the street number and the name of the family living at
the residence.44 She argued that striking down ordinances such as
that did not promote those underlying free speech values, and
indeed, cited the majority’s concession that many such laws were
“entirely reasonable.”45
Justice Breyer echoed many of these points.46 Indeed, he began
his concurring opinion by criticizing the idea that a finding of
content discrimination should automatically trigger strict
scrutiny.47 Instead, he described the content-neutrality rule (that is,
the presumptive prohibition on content discriminatory statutes48)
as merely “a rule of thumb”49 rather than a rigid command.
Reprising a theme he had raised four years earlier in Sorrell50 and
that he would raise three years later in NIFLA,51 Justice Breyer also
expressed worry about the impact of a rigid application of the
content-neutrality rule on day-to-day regulation that normally is
not thought to trigger significant First Amendment concerns:
[T]o use the presence of content discrimination automatically to
trigger strict scrutiny and thereby call into play a strong
ensure that the government has not regulated speech ‘based on hostility—or favoritism—
towards the underlying message expressed.’” (first quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S.
464, 476 (2014); and then quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992))).
44. See id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 2236 (quoting id. at 2231 (majority opinion)). Justice Alito, joined by Justice
Kennedy and Justice Sotomayor, wrote a brief concurrence that sought to reassure local
governments and others that a variety of types of sign restrictions remained within the
government’s power to enact. See id. at 2233–34 (Alito, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring) (identifying the underlying free speech
values served by focusing on the content-neutrality of the challenged law).
47. Id. (“The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the
Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a
simple recitation of categories, such as ‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would
permit. In my view, the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many
contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’
trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.”).
48. See supra note 3.
49. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct.
2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (repeating this
phraseology and citing his opinion in Reed).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 63–65.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 89–98.
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presumption against constitutionality goes too far. That is because
virtually all government activities involve speech, many of
which involve the regulation of speech. Regulatory programs
almost always require content discrimination. And to hold that
such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a
recipe for judicial management of ordinary government
regulatory activity.52

Thus, just as Justice Breyer worried in Sorrell and NIFLA about
the expansion of the content-neutrality rule into new contexts, in
Reed he worried about a rigid application of the content-neutrality
rule’s strict scrutiny requirement—here, to apply in every
situation where a law drew facial content-based distinctions. In
critiquing both of these closely related phenomena, Justice
Breyer argued that the majority’s approach would be problematic
because of its potential to intrude into the realm of legitimate
government regulation.53
Given his concern about such First Amendment rigidity, it
should not be surprising that he concluded his analysis in Reed by
repeating his familiar call for an explicit balancing approach to free
speech issues, in which a court “asks whether the regulation at
issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is
disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.”54 In
the context of Reed, that balancing would replace a rigid insistence
on performing strict scrutiny in every case of content-based
regulation. Accordingly, he argued in Reed that
[t]he better approach is to generally treat content discrimination
as a strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule
where a traditional public forum, or where viewpoint
discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of

52. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53. See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 179 (“[W]ere
Reed applied universally as advocates urge, the commercial speech doctrine—along with
other topic-based sub-doctrines such as those that currently permit the greater regulation of
child pornography, obscenity, fraud, perjury, price-fixing, conspiracy, or solicitation—
would be rendered obsolete, thereby rendering large swaths of the administrative state
presumptively unconstitutional.”).
54. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235–36 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. at 2236 (citing two of his
earlier opinions calling for a similar balancing approach); Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (repeating this same call).
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thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative legal tool, in an
appropriate case, to determine the strength of a justification.55

III. SORRELL: THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY RULE’S
INVASION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. involved a First Amendment challenge
to a Vermont law prohibiting the sale, for marketing purposes, of
information related to physicians’ prescribing practices. Such
information could include, for example, whether a physician favors
certain families of drugs or normally prescribes more expensive
“brand-name” drugs rather than their cheaper generic versions.56
As the Court explained, such information is highly useful to
pharmaceutical marketers who seek to convince doctors to
prescribe their firms’ drugs.57 Those marketers work with so-called
data miners—entities that acquire that information from
pharmacies and aggregate it into reports that are then sold to socalled detailers, who use those reports to refine marketing
presentations to doctors.58 For a variety of reasons, such as a
desire to encourage doctors to prescribe lower-cost generic drugs
rather than more expensive brand-name varieties, Vermont
prohibited the sale or use of doctors’ prescription information for
marketing purposes.59
The Court struck down the law, holding that it violated the First
Amendment. Most notably for current purposes, the six-Justice
majority, speaking through Justice Kennedy, emphasized that the
Vermont law enacted a content-, viewpoint-, and speaker-based
restriction on speech: respectively, it restricted marketing
speech (as opposed, say, to research speech) that invariably favored
brand-name drugs and that was uttered by detailers.60 Even

55. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring).
56. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 552 (2011).
57. See id. at 558 (“Salespersons can be more effective when they know the background
and purchasing preferences of their clientele, and pharmaceutical salespersons are no
exception. Knowledge of a physician’s prescription practices—called ‘prescriber-identifying
information’—enables a detailer better to ascertain which doctors are likely to be interested
in a particular drug and how best to present a particular sales message.”).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 557–61 (setting forth the law and its factual background).
60. See id. at 565 (content and viewpoint basis); id. at 563 (content and speaker basis);
see also Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64
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assuming that the law triggered more relaxed scrutiny because of
its focus on assertedly commercial speech, the Court concluded that
the law had to be invalidated,61 largely because of its contentdiscriminatory nature.62
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
dissented. Again for our current purposes, the most important
point of his dissent is his critique of the majority’s heavy focus on
the content-neutrality requirement.63 He expressed concern about
the majority’s suggestion that the content-based nature of the
Vermont law justified more stringent scrutiny than a commercial
speech regulation would normally trigger, pointing out that laws
regulating business and incidentally impacting speech usually
target particular content and particular speakers.64 As Justice
Breyer asked, “[g]iven the ubiquity of content-based regulatory
categories, why should the ‘content-based’ nature of typical
regulation require courts (other things being equal) to grant
legislators and regulators less deference [than in a normal
commercial speech case]?”65
Engaging his own question with a word of caution, he then
wrote that “[i]f the Court means to create constitutional barriers to
regulatory rules that might affect the content of a commercial
message, it has embarked upon an unprecedented task—a task that
threatens significant judicial interference with widely accepted

ALA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2012) (“[I]n Sorrell, content neutrality is the first and most critical inquiry,
with Central Hudson bringing up the rear.”).
61. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (concluding that there was “no need to determine
whether all speech hampered by § 4631(d) is commercial, as our cases have used that term”
because the result would be the same even under a commercial speech analysis).
62. See id. (“In the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is
content-based and, in practice, viewpoint discriminatory. The State argues that a different
analysis applies here because, assuming § 4631(d) burdens speech at all, it at most burdens
only commercial speech. As in previous cases, however, the outcome is the same whether a
special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”)
(citations omitted).
63. Justice Breyer highlighted the majority’s emphasis on the content-based nature of
the Vermont law. See id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the parts of the majority opinion
that focused on this aspect of the law).
64. See id. at 589–90 (citing examples of both content-based and speaker-based
business regulation laws that impact speech); see also, e.g., Mason, supra note 23, at 983
(“Almost by definition, a law regulating commercial speech will distinguish speech facially
based on its content.”).
65. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 589 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
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regulatory activity.”66 Unsurprisingly, he concluded this part of
his analysis by warning that the Court’s approach to this
question threatened to revive Lochner-era judicial scrutiny of
business regulations.67
Sorrell laid the groundwork for increased emphasis on the
content-based nature of a challenged law as part of a court’s First
Amendment review.68 Of course, as Part I explained,69 the contentneutrality rule has been a foundation of First Amendment
jurisprudence for nearly fifty years. In recent years, the Court has
relied heavily on that rule,70 rejecting arguments that either the rule
fails to furnish a sure-fire guide to decision71 or that the context calls
for a different approach.72 But Sorrell is different from those other
cases because, as Justice Breyer explains, it applies the contentneutrality rule in an unusual context—that is, a context in which
essentially all regulation of that type (i.e., all commercial speech
regulation) could be described as content-based. Thus, in
colonizing commercial speech doctrine the content-neutrality rule
would devour it, by implying that all commercial speech
regulations should be tested by the more stringent standards

66. Id. at 590; see also Mason, supra note 23 at 984 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a
regulation of commercial speech that would not trigger Reed’s strict scrutiny analysis.”).
67. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 591–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer then moved on
to apply standard commercial speech scrutiny to the Vermont law, which he concluded the
law survived. See id. at 593-602. To be sure, this Article is far from the first one to discuss the
alleged “Lochnerization” of the First Amendment or the increased interest business groups
have shown in using (some say “weaponizing”) the First Amendment in pursuit of a
deregulatory agenda. See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 53. But this Article attempts to link that
concern as reflected in Justice Breyer’s dissent to the Court’s more general expansion of the
domain of the content-neutrality rule, as discussed in Parts III and IV, and its more rigid
definition of content-neutrality, see supra Part II.
68. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 335-36 (2016) (noting the importance of this aspect of Sorrell’s analysis).
69. See supra Part I.
70. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
71. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing the rule as a “glittering generality”).
72. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs., 564 U.S. at 818 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the antisocial and destructive nature of violent video games warrants their regulation).
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triggered by the content-neutrality rule73 rather than the ostensibly
default rule applicable to such regulations.74
To be sure, the majority’s concluding paragraphs in Sorrell
attempted to steer the Court’s analysis back toward a more
conventional commercial speech inquiry.75 The Court thus kept
open the question of whether the content-neutrality rule has in fact
fully colonized commercial speech doctrine. Nevertheless, the
signals it sent earlier in the opinion suggest an approach that would
call into serious question the viability of a distinct, less speechprotective commercial speech jurisprudence.76

73. See, e.g., Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation After Reed:
Suggestions for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 URB. LAW. 569, 596 (2015) (“[T]he Court’s
application of content neutrality review in Sorrell seems to upset prior judicial approaches to
reviewing commercial speech regulations.”); Mason supra note 23, at 983 (“complete
application of Reed to commercial speech would essentially overrule all existing commercial
speech doctrine”); Shanor, supra note 53 at 150 (“[Sorrell] goes the furthest in chipping away
the initial architecture of the commercial speech doctrine and in undermining the features
that the Court that created the doctrine put in place to ensure that the First Amendment
would not be the undoing of the regulatory state.”).
74. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (describing review under
Central Hudson as “intermediate scrutiny”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing the level of scrutiny
the Court held as applicable to commercial speech as “intermediate scrutiny”).
75. Those paragraphs began with Justice Kennedy’s concession that “content-based
restrictions on protected expression are sometimes permissible, and that principle applies to
commercial speech.” Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011). Of course, this
statement does not single out commercial speech doctrine as uniquely accommodating of
content-based restrictions; indeed, if anything, it lumps that doctrine in with more general
First Amendment law. However, he then focuses on the doctrinal elements of commercial
speech regulation. He noted that there was no claim that the speech in question was
misleading. See id. He then concluded that Vermont’s goals in enacting the law did not center
on privacy protection, an interest he suggested might have placed the law on firmer
constitutional footing, but instead on “advanc[ing] its own side in a debate . . . burden[ing]
a form of protected expression that it found too persuasive . . . , [and leaving] unburdened
those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views.” Id. at 580. These
arguments suggest the law’s grounding, not in the types of commercial harms that normally
justify commercial speech regulation, but in ideologically-based skewing of the
marketplace—the type of grounding that would normally doom even a commercial speech
regulation. See also id. at 571 (concluding that the Court need not decide whether the same
presumptive invalidity that attends content-based distinctions within non-commercial
speech should apply to content-based distinctions within commercial speech since,
according to the Court, “the outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech
inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied”).
76. See supra note 75.
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IV. NIFLA: THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY RULE’S
INVASION OF COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra
(NIFLA),77 the Court held that a California law violated the First
Amendment when it required certain types of medical institutions
specializing in pregnancy care to post state-created messages
concerning the availability of free or low-cost state-provided
pregnancy services, including abortions,78 and requiring similar
facilities, if they were unlicensed by the state, to disclose that fact.79
Considered as a First Amendment matter,80 both provisions
presented a straightforward question of the government’s
authority to compel an entity’s speech.81
In NIFLA, just as in Sorrell, the Court emphasized the fact that
the compelled speech required the institutions in question to
communicate a particular message—that is, the law imposed a
speech compulsion that was content-based.82 Indeed, the Court,
speaking through Justice Thomas, began its analysis by
emphasizing the doctrinal distinction between content-neutral and
content-based legislation.83 That introductory analysis started by
repeating Reed’s insistence that all content-based laws be subject to

77. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
78. See id. at 2368–69 (discussing the “licensed notice” provision).
79. See id. at 2369–70 (describing the “unlicensed notice” provision).
80. The case, of course, also implicated governmental power to influence a woman’s
decision whether to have an abortion—a question that itself implicates the First Amendment
when such an attempt takes the form of requiring a doctor or other medical provider to
communicate particular information to the pregnant woman. See id. at 2373–74 (discussing
this aspect of the case); id. at 2384–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
81. See id. at 2371 (majority opinion) (“The licensed notice is a content-based
regulation of speech.”); id. at 2377 (“The unlicensed notice imposes a government-scripted,
speaker-based disclosure requirement . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., James A. Campbell, Compelled Speech in Masterpiece Cakeshop: What the
Supreme Court’s June 2018 Decisions Tell Us About the Unresolved Questions, 19 FEDERALIST
SOC’Y REV. 142, 146 (2018) (“The majority opinion [in NIFLA] . . . began by announcing that
the licensed notice ‘is a content-based regulation of speech.’” (quoting NIFLA, 138 S. Ct.
at 2371)).
83. The first substantive statement on the merits of the case reads as follows: “The First
Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws
that abridge the freedom of speech. When enforcing this prohibition, our precedents
distinguish between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.” NIFLA, 138
S. Ct. at 2371; see also supra note 82.
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strict scrutiny84 and the principle underlying that requirement85
and then finding the California law to be content-based.86 The
Court then proceeded to consider, and reject, the possibility that the
professional-speech context of the California law constituted “a
unique category [of speech] that is exempt from ordinary First
Amendment principles.”87 It then assumed that such “a unique
category” did exist, because it concluded that, even if it did, the law
in question would fail intermediate scrutiny.88
As he did in Sorrell, Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, this time
for four Justices.89 Just like the majority, he began his analysis with
the content-neutrality point—but with a very different agenda.
Justice Breyer expressed concern with the Court’s emphasis on the
84. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (“As a general matter, [content-based] laws ‘are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they
are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015))). For a discussion of Reed, and in particular, Reed’s insistence that
all content-neutral laws be automatically subject to strict scrutiny, see Part II of this Article.
85. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (“This stringent standard [the strict scrutiny standard]
reflects the fundamental principle that governments have ‘no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct.
at 2226)); see also id. at 2374 (“The dangers associated with content-based regulations of
speech are also present in the context of professional speech. As with other kinds of speech,
regulating the content of professionals’ speech ‘pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government
seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or
information.’ . . . Further, when the government polices the content of professional speech,
it can fail to ‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.’” (first alteration in original) (first quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641 (1994); and then quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014))).
86. Id. at 2371 (“The [law’s] licensed notice [requirement] is a content-based regulation
of speech. By compelling individuals to speak a particular message, such notices ‘alte[r] the
content of [their] speech.’” (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
795 (1988))).
87. Id. at 2375. The Court made this statement in the context of its review of the
licensed notice provision. The Court struck down the unlicensed notice provision using, for
purposes of argument, the relatively deferential review the Court has accorded to
requirements that commercial speakers disclose “factual and uncontroversial information.”
See id. at 2372, 2376–78 (noting the parties’ disagreement about the applicability of the more
deferential review standard for disclosures of “factual and uncontroversial information,” id.
at 2372, under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), but
concluding that the unlicensed notice provision failed even Zauderer scrutiny).
88. See id. (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive
reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary
First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists.
We need not do so because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.”).
89. See id. at 2379 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan had joined Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell, while Justice Sotomayor
had joined the majority.

891

001.ARAIZA_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:34 PM

2019

content-neutrality rule, arguing that such an emphasis “threatens
to create serious problems.”90 Repeating the concern he expressed
in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,91 he observed that “much, perhaps most,
human behavior takes place through speech and . . . much, perhaps
most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content.”92 Thus,
he cautioned, an approach that automatically applied strict
scrutiny to any law deemed content-based would, in Justice
Breyer’s words, “at the least threaten[] considerable litigation
over the constitutional validity of much, perhaps most,
government regulation.”93
Justice Breyer’s statement focused on what I call the “depth”
aspect of the content-neutrality rule—here, the requirement that
content-based laws automatically trigger strict scrutiny.94 But he
then focused on the closely-related “scope” aspect of that rule—
here, the application of the content-neutrality requirement to the
compelled speech context at issue in NIFLA. Addressing that
context against the backdrop of the majority’s focus on the contentneutrality requirement, he wrote: “Virtually every disclosure law
could be considered ‘content-based,’ for virtually every disclosure
law requires individuals ‘to speak a particular message.’”95 After
discounting the majority’s notably offhand statement that “we do
not question the legality of health and safety warnings long
considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial
disclosures about commercial products,”96 Justice Breyer
90. Id. at 2380.
91. See supra Part II (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions in Reed).
92. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. See id. (“Before turning to the specific law before us, I focus upon the general
interpretation of the First Amendment that the majority says it applies. It applies heightened
scrutiny to the Act because the Act, in its view, is ‘content based.’ Ante, at 2371. ‘By
compelling individuals to speak a particular message,’ it adds, ‘such notices “alte[r] the
content of [their] speech.”‘ Ante, at 2371. ‘As a general matter,’ the majority concludes, such
laws are ‘presumptively unconstitutional’ and are subject to ‘stringent’ review. Ante, at
2371. . . . This constitutional approach threatens to create serious problems. Because much,
perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech and because much, perhaps most,
law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s approach at the least threatens
considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government
regulation.”(first and second alterations in original)).
95. Id.; see also, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277,
1291 (2014) (equating compelled speech with content-based regulation).
96. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2376 (majority
opinion)). Justice Breyer questioned the usefulness of that unsupported statement. Id.
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concluded his general remarks by expressing the same concern he
raised in Sorrell and Reed97 about the Court’s use of the First
Amendment as a weapon against the type of business regulation
long presumed constitutional.98
To be sure, NIFLA was not the first case to expand the contentneutrality rule (and its strict scrutiny requirement) into the realm
of compelled speech.99 Nevertheless, its emphasis on that rule is
notable when one recognizes that many previous compelled speech
cases relied on other factors when determining the appropriate
judicial scrutiny. Barnette100 was decided decades before the
content-neutrality rule was announced and has been understood as
grounded in the First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination.101 The other foundational statement on compelled
speech, Wooley v. Maynard,102 largely ignored the content-neutrality
question in favor of Barnette’s focus on the state’s attempt to force
citizens to propagate its own preferred ideological message.103
97. See supra Part II (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions in Reed).
98. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (“Mandating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.
We therefore consider the [challenged] Act as a content-based regulation of speech.”); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (“Our precedents thus apply the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens
upon speech because of its content. Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech
bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny.”).
100. In W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court struck down a
school’s mandatory flag salute. It is generally considered to be the foundational compelled
speech case.
101. See, e.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 61 ALB. L. REV. 501, 507 (2000) (“West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette . . . is probably the Court’s best known and most eloquent expression of
the First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.” (footnote omitted)). This
characterization of Barnette necessarily raises the thorny question of the difference between
content discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. For one careful analysis of that
distinction, see Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom
of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315 (1997).
102. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
103. See id. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces
an individual, as part of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in public
view to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State ‘invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it
is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)); see also, e.g., Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-cv-0654-PJH,
2016 WL 5339804 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) (rejecting a compelled speech challenge to a law
requiring that a convicted sex offender’s passport convey information attesting to that
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Since Wooley, the Court has continued to focus on questions
unrelated to content-neutrality when considering compelled
speech issues,104 including the nature of the compelled speech.105 By
contrast, the Court’s analysis in NIFLA led off with106 and

conviction, in part because the speech was government speech, but also, distinguishing
Wooley and Riley, because the law simply required the communication of facts rather than an
ideological message); id. at *16 (“The test of whether the state has violated an individual’s
right to refrain from speaking is ‘whether the individual is forced to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.’” (quoting
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715)); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., Inc., No. EDCV 04–407–
VAP (SGLx), 2007 WL 8433882, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2007) (“The Court [in Wooley] applied
strict scrutiny, because ‘[t]he First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a
point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire
commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715)). See generally Sadurski, supra note 101 (examining the distinction
between content and viewpoint discrimination).
104. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1997)
(upholding a compelled advertising subsidy exacted on California tree fruit producers and
distinguishing earlier compelled speech cases on the grounds that the exaction did not stop
producers from engaging in their own speech, did not compel actual speech on the part of
the growers, and did not compel them to fund any “political or ideological views”); United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (striking down a mushroom advertising
exaction without identifying the content-based nature of the subsidized speech as
constitutionally relevant, and relying instead on the ground that, unlike the program in
Glickman, it was not part of a comprehensive regulatory program of the industry); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[T]he interests at stake in
[requiring an attorney to disclose the possibility of client liability for litigation costs in a
contingency fee arrangement] are not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo,
and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 232–35 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment required that non-members of
public sector unions in closed shops not be compelled to subsidize the union’s political
speech, given the importance of the right to engage in or subsidize, or refrain from engaging
in or subsidizing, political speech); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(overruling the part of Abood that allowed compulsory exaction of fees from non-union
members for purposes of defraying the union’s representation and negotiation expenses,
without referencing the content-basis of the compelled exaction); id. at 2464 (identifying the
“additional damage” done by laws compelling, rather than preventing, speech as the
“demeaning” effect of “[f]orcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find
objectionable”); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (“Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to
propound political messages with which they disagree, [the] protection [corporations enjoy
to decide what not to say] would be empty.”). But see supra note 99 (citing compelled speech
cases where the Court did in fact focus on the content-neutrality issue).
105. See, e.g., Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469–70; Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 16; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
651; Abood, 431 U.S. at 232–35.
106. See supra note 83.
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continually emphasized107 the content-neutrality rule. That
emphasis is particularly notable in light of Sorrell’s similar
expansion and, as explained in Part II, in light of Reed’s more
stringent definition of content discrimination.108
Just as notable as the parallel between the majority opinions in
NIFLA and Sorrell is the parallel between the concerns Justice
Breyer expressed in his dissents in those two cases. Recall that in
Sorrell, Justice Breyer noted that, almost by definition, most
commercial speech regulation singled out speech based on the
identity of the speaker (that is, the particular type of business the
speaker was in) and the content of that speech (speech about that
particular product or service). Thus, given the Sorrell majority’s
focus on the content-neutrality rule, most commercial speech
regulation would trigger the strict scrutiny that rule demands.
Justice Breyer found that result both substantively problematic and
inconsistent with existing free speech jurisprudence (that is, the
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech the Court announced
in Central Hudson).109
Similarly, in NIFLA, Justice Breyer observed that most
compelled speech mandates, by definition, single out particular
speakers and particular content.110 Just as with commercial speech,
Justice Breyer worried that the across-the-board imposition of
strict scrutiny anytime a compelled speech mandate rested on
speaker identity or content raised serious policy concerns and
107. See supra note 85.
108. But see Corbin, supra note 95, at 1283 (“The default rule is that as a content-based
regulation, compelled speech must pass strict scrutiny.”). Professor Corbin’s statement
appears to focus on the intuitive characterization of compelled speech mandates as contentbased regulations, rather than on any doctrine that explicitly relied on the content-neutrality
rule in a compelled speech case. See id. (making that characterization).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65 (noting these points about Justice Breyer’s
dissent in Sorrell). In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (1980), the Court adopted a four-part test for judging restrictions on commercial speech.
As the Central Hudson Court itself set the test out, “At the outset, we must determine whether
the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.” Id. at 566. See also Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights
Movement, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 10 (2016) (locating Central Hudson scrutiny on the spectrum
between rational basis review and strict scrutiny).
110. See supra note 95.
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threatened to undermine existing precedents.111 In his view,
NIFLA’s approach to compelled speech, just like Sorrell’s approach
to commercial speech, threatened to supplant pre-existing doctrine
with an inappropriate and dangerous importation of the contentneutrality rule.
V. EXPLAINING THE INVASION
At this point, an obvious question arises: Why has the Court
launched the invasion of the content-neutrality rule? Recognizing
that it is difficult to accurately ascribe motivations to multi-member
institutions with complex internal dynamics,112 possible
explanations, both external and internal to legal doctrine,
nevertheless readily emerge.
A. The Campaign for Business
Externally, one can understand the invasion of the contentneutrality rule as part and parcel of—or, to continue the invasion
metaphor, a front in—business interests’ decades-long campaign to
shape legal rules to their benefit. On this theory, the expansion of
strict First Amendment rules constitutes simply one part of a
broader litigation campaign by business interests.113 That campaign
aims at, among other goals, limiting access to federal courts on the

111. See supra text accompanying notes 89–98. Indeed, one could combine these
concerns and suggest that a subset of commercial speech regulation consisting of
compulsions of commercial speech raise particularly acute worries about imposition of a
strict content-neutrality requirement. Such compulsions—such as warning labels,
notifications of legal rights, and statements about the lack of governmental verification of
product claims—are a staple of modern regulation. For a discussion of a regulation that
compels speech that the majority assumed to be commercial, compare National Association of
Manufacturers v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), concluding that, even if the compelled
disclosures regarding “conflict minerals” regulated commercial speech it was nevertheless
unconstitutional, with id. at 373 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in part), noting that a preliminary
legal conclusion relevant to that holding was at that point currently under consideration by
the en banc court. Thanks to Ashutosh Bhagwat for suggesting this point.
112. Cf. William D. Araiza, Playing Well with Others—But Still Winning: Chief Justice
Roberts, Precedent, and the Possibilities of a Multi-Member Court, 46 GA. L. REV. 1059 (2012)
(considering one facet of the dynamics present on a multi-member court).
113. See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 53, at 154–63 (tracing the evolution of this campaign).
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part of consumers,114 employees,115 and foreigners116 injured by
businesses; ratcheting up judicial review of takings claims;117 and,
more generally, arguing that corporations enjoy the protections of
the Bill of Rights.118 In terms of the First Amendment itself, for years
now scholars have identified and (mostly) decried “First
Amendment Lochnerism”—that is, the use of the First Amendment
as a tool for business to pursue a deregulatory agenda.119 Of course,
this campaign (both more generally and as applied to the First
Amendment in particular) could not have succeeded without the
agreement of the Justices themselves. In this sense, the now-famous
1971 memo written by Lewis Powell shortly before ascending to the
Court, concerning the need for business to promote its interests
more aggressively, can stand as the starting point for the Justices’
receptivity to this campaign.120

114. This aspect of the campaign includes, for example, expanding the reach and force
of mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. See, e.g., Lauren Guth Barnes,
How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights
and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 330 (2015) (explaining how
recent Court decisions have strengthened the force of such agreements).
115. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (rejecting the use of
statistical evidence to establish the commonality of legal claims necessary to bring a class
action on behalf of 1.5 million female employees of Wal-Mart); see also Andrew J. Trask,
Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Litigation Strategy and Legal Change, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 791,
792–93 (2013) (citing cases disagreeing over the change Dukes made in class action law).
116. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (limiting the
jurisdictional reach of the Alien Tort Statute); see also Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel:
Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by
Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2014)
(considering the implications of Kiobel and other cases that limit U.S. judicial remedies for
legal violations that occur abroad).
117. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)
(reviewing the constitutionality under the Takings Clause of government exactions imposed
in exchange for development permits); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (same);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (same); see also David L. Callies, Through
a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 44 (2014)
(noting the Court’s creation of the exactions doctrine in Nollan and Dolan).
118. See generally Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (describing this development).
119. For an early statement of this idea, see Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., Commercial Speech, Economic Due Process, and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30–31
(1979), for a discussion linking Lochner with the Court’s then-newly minted commercial
speech doctrine.
120. See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 53, at 155 (“The origins of th[e] mobilization [described
in the text] are often attributed to Justice Lewis Powell.”); id. at 155–63 (describing the Powell
Memo and its effects).
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An evaluation of this possible justification need not require
extended discussion. Whatever one might think about the
legitimacy and desirability of increased legal protection for
business operations, obtaining such protection under the banner of
the First Amendment is inappropriate unless such protection
reflects the underlying reasons for protecting speech or a coherent
jurisprudential theory of free speech. In other words, if First
Amendment protection for business operations is justified, it must
be for a reason other than the fact that it is business that stands to
reap the benefit.
B. The Logic of the Content-Neutrality Rule
Additional explanations for the invasion arise both from the
general nature of legal doctrine as well as from within the four
corners of First Amendment doctrine more particularly. Speaking
first to the former, it remains as true today as a century ago that
doctrinal rules tend to expand to their logical limit.121 If the contentneutrality rule is indeed foundational to First Amendment
doctrine, we should not be surprised when it colonizes the
doctrine’s every nook and cranny.122
Perhaps the opening bell for this colonization sounded in 1992,
when the Court, over several bitter opinions concurring only in the
judgment, held in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul123 that the contentneutrality rule applied even in cases of unprotected speech.124 In
R.A.V., the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that
criminalized the placing of any object on public or private property
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses

121. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
122. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 110 (1993) (“The generalization
and universalization of freedom of speech, and the Court’s concomitant devotion to its
abstract doctrine of ‘content neutrality’ . . . have combined to produce a Lochnerization of
the First Amendment.”).
123. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
124. See id. For the criticism leveled at the majority by the main concurrence, see id. at
397–98 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]n the present case, the majority casts aside
long-established First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an
untried theory. This is hardly a judicious way of proceeding, and the Court’s reasoning in
reaching its result is transparently wrong.”). See also id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment) (also criticizing the majority’s reasoning); id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment) (same).
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anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender.”125 While the Court followed the state
supreme court’s construction of the ordinance to apply only to
constitutionally unprotected “fighting words,”126 it nevertheless
held that “the ordinance [wa]s facially unconstitutional in that it
prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the
subjects the speech addresses.”127 If the content-neutrality rule
applied in R.A.V., even when the speech at issue was otherwise
assumed to lack constitutional protection,128 we should not be
surprised when it was held to apply in other areas that had
previously been governed by a unique set of rules that, ostensibly129
unlike the rule at issue in R.A.V., provided at least some degree of
protection to speech.130
This tentative conclusion—that the content-neutrality rule
tends to expand to the limits of its logic—assumes that the First
Amendment is, or should be,131 “a law of rules”132 which is best
implemented when courts apply doctrinal rules consistently across
the board, with little or no recognition of differences in factual
125. Id. at 380 (quoting the ordinance).
126. See id. at 381 (recognizing the Court’s mandate to accept the state court’s
construction of the ordinance).
127. Id.; see also id. at 391 (“In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.”).
128. But see id. at 383 (“We have sometimes said that . . . categories of expression
[including fighting words] are ‘not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,’ or
that the ‘protection of the First Amendment does not extend’ to them. Such statements must
be taken in context, however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated
shorthand characterizing obscenity ‘as not being speech at all.’” (first quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); and then quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984); and then quoting Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 615 n.46)).
129. But see supra note 128 (R.A.V. majority’s suggestion that even “unprotected
speech” does not fall completely outside of the First Amendment’s protection).
130. This is not to say that Justices favoring expansion of the content-neutrality rule
necessarily favor its introduction into every single area of free speech law. See, e.g., Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech
restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were
based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”
(citing cases dealing with the First Amendment rights of students, prisoners, soldiers, and
federal employees)).
131. See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 24, at 234 (defending a rule-grounded First
Amendment doctrine because of the predictability it would provide).
132. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989)
(arguing in favor of rigid doctrinal rules rather than vague, context-specific standards
in adjudication).
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context.133 An analogous dynamic might also explain the Court’s
embrace of a rigid definition of content-neutrality in Reed. It is
consistent with a rigid insistence that all content-based laws trigger
strict scrutiny to embrace an analogously formal definition of
content discrimination—especially one that denominates facially
classifying laws as “content-based”—rather than a more contextual
definition that focuses only on the government’s justifications.134
Just as a rigid anti-race-classification rule in equal protection
logically suggests that any facial race classification will trigger strict
scrutiny regardless of its underlying justifications,135 so too a rigid
insistence on content-neutrality logically implies a rule that
disfavors facial content distinctions, even if those distinctions are
justified by benign (i.e., noncensorial) motives.136
This logic is not inevitable: one can envision a First Amendment
doctrine that reserves strict scrutiny for laws a court holds pose

133. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 122, at 112 (“[T]he Burger and Rehnquist Court
Justices [made efforts] to create a formal and neutral system of free speech doctrine that could
escape from what it regarded as the ‘subjective’ and ‘political’ criteria of the Warren era.”).
For an incisive examination of Justice Scalia’s attempt to impose a “law of rules” in several
First Amendment areas (an attempt the author believes to have failed), see Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Free Speech and a “Law of Rules,” 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159 (2017).
134. See Horwitz, supra note 122, at 112 (describing the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’
attempts to create a formal and value-neutral free speech doctrine).
135. Cf. Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012). In
Intentional Blindness, Professor Haney-Lopez explains how in the immediate aftermath of the
Court’s statement of the discriminatory intent requirement and its explication of the factors
relevant to the intent inquiry the Court applied that requirement and those factors in a more
contextual, less rigid manner, only ultimately to adopt a more rigid approach that viewed all
facial racial classifications as reflecting “discriminatory intent.”
136. See Horwitz, supra note 122, at 102–16 (identifying both the Court’s race and speech
jurisprudence in the early 1990s as reflecting a search for neutral, value-free judicial decisionmaking, but at the price of ignoring factual contexts that make such formality
counterproductive in terms of the goals underlying the Equal Protection and Free Speech
clauses); Lakier, supra note 5 (analogizing between free speech and equal protection doctrine
on this basis). Indeed, one can analogize between the Justices’ explanation that a broad rule
demanding strict scrutiny of any race classification serves to “smoke out” ultimate
illegitimate intent. See, for example, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1988) (plurality opinion), and their explanations for similarly rigid standards in First
Amendment cases. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (“Innocent
motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based
statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress
disfavored speech.”); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
774, (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict
categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics
cries loudest for limiting what may be said.”).
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clear threats to free speech values,137 just as one can envision an
equal protection doctrine that distinguishes between race
classifications justified on benign grounds and those that lack such
a justification.138 Justice Stevens famously insisted that First
Amendment cases should be decided based on first principles,
rather than rigid doctrinal rules.139 Thus, for example, he fiercely
opposed laws—in particular, commercial speech regulations—that
he viewed as reflecting governmental paternalism toward
consumers,140 even while he abjured reflexive reliance on the
content-neutrality rule.141 On the current Court, Justice Breyer has
adopted a somewhat similar position. He has acknowledged
that viewpoint neutrality, rather than content-neutrality, is
137. See, e.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237–38 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment) (offering
criteria to determine whether any given content-based law merits strict scrutiny). To be sure,
adherents of a more rigid approach to defining constitutionality might well find threats to
free speech values lurking in any facial content discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 2229 (majority
opinion) (“Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a
facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such
statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why the First Amendment expressly targets
the operation of the laws—i.e., the ‘abridg[ement] of speech’—rather than merely the
motives of those who enacted them.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
138. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc., v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165
(1977) (“There is no doubt that in [the challenged legislative creation of legislative districts]
the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But its plan represented no racial
slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no discrimination
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
242, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for failing to see the difference
“between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat” in the context of an equal protection
challenge to a race-based set-aside). But see id. at 229–30 (majority opinion) (answering that
argument); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
139. See generally John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293 (1993).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, he consistently argued for analogous attention to first principles in
equal protection adjudication. See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John
Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339
(2006) (considering this aspect of Justice Stevens’s equal protection jurisprudence); William
D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond the Rules, 44 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 889 (2011) (considering the parallels between Justice Stevens’s approach to the
First Amendment and equal protection).
140. See, e.g., Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(“[I]n keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude that a state legislature does not have the
broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
purposes . . . .”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1987) (criticizing a lower court
injunction for keeping speech away from the public as reflecting a “paternalistic strategy”).
141. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (noting that the challenged law
could be analyzed under the content-neutrality requirement but declining to do so on the
ground that a result based on that rule would allow the government to cure the violation by
banning even more speech).
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indeed a free speech first principle that warrants careful judicial
protection,142 even while insisting in case after case that First
Amendment questions should be decided by balancing the
government’s interest against the extent of the First Amendment
harm the law imposed.143
But despite these (mostly) dissenting voices, the logic that
dictates a rigid strict scrutiny rule for any content-based law slides
easily into logic that insists on a rigid approach to defining content
discrimination, and vice-versa. In other words, the horizontal logic
of the content-neutrality rule’s rigidity, which I have called the
rule’s scope (i.e., applying to more and more speech contexts) both
influences and is influenced by a vertical logic, which I have called
its depth (i.e., insisting on a similarly rigid approach to the prior,
definitional, step in the analysis). When combined, these logics
exert an expansionist pressure that results in the jurisprudence this
Article has examined and critiqued.
C. The Romance of Free Speech
The content-neutrality rule may also be appealing to a majority
of Justices—including some liberal ones144—because of the First
Amendment’s romantic quality. Put (perhaps too) simply, the First
Amendment, and in particular its Speech Clause, has become
iconic. It has generated some of the most eloquent language the U.S.
142. See, e.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233, 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgement) (“The
better approach [in First Amendment cases] is to generally treat content discrimination as a
strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule . . . where viewpoint
discrimination . . . is threatened . . . .”).
143. See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgement); United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730–34 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400–03 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). For an appraisal
of this approach, and of Justice Breyer’s approach to First Amendment cases more generally,
see Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?,
89 MINN. L. REV. 1280 (2005).
144. Notably, Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinions in Reed and Sorrell,
although she joined Justice Breyer’s dissent in NIFLA. See also Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(explaining that she joined the majority in Sorrell, but expressing concern about how the
Court has applied the case, for example, in NIFLA, where she joined the dissent). See also
supra note 136 (citing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, which approved of “fairly strict categorical rules” in the First
Amendment context). Indeed, Justice Souter joined the majority opinion in R.A.V. See R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 378 (1992).

902

001.ARAIZA_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

875

7/17/20 12:34 PM

Invasion of the Content-Neutrality Rule

Reports can offer.145 That language often speaks in soaring terms of
the fundamentals of American freedom: democratic selfgovernment, a collective and fearless search for truth, and
individual autonomy in its most foundational embodiment—the
freedom to form and express one’s own thoughts.146 Beyond
making the First Amendment a favored argument for would-be
plaintiffs,147 this romanticism influences First Amendment doctrine
in at least two ways. First, it makes it difficult for the Court to justify
excluding a type of speech from any First Amendment

145. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). See generally ARTHUR D.
HELLMAN ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF
RELIGION, at xxxv (4th ed. 2018) (“No other area of law has so often inspired the Justices of
the Supreme Court to write opinions marked by eloquence and passion.”).
146. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“The First Amendment reflects
‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ That is because ‘speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.’” (first quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); and then quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964))); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities
in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). Canonical statements of First
Amendment law from the earlier years of its developments reflect this same idea. See, e.g.,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won
our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and
that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.”); see also Ashutosh
Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1450–51 (2017) (“Over the
years, scholars and judges have identified three principle [sic] theories explaining why the
First Amendment protects freedom of expression. The first is that free speech is necessary to
advance the search for truth . . . . The second . . . is that speech is an essential component of
individual autonomy and self-fulfillment . . . . The third . . . is that the First Amendment is
intended to enable democratic self-governance and participatory politics.”).
147. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1789–90 (2004) (“Any account of
the political, cultural, and economic dynamics of the First Amendment must start with what
we can call the First Amendment’s magnetism . . . . To an extent unmatched in a world that
often views America’s obsession with free speech as reflecting an insensitive neglect of other
important conflicting values, the First Amendment, freedom of speech, and freedom of the
press provide [litigants] considerable rhetorical power and argumentative authority.”
(footnote omitted)).
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protection.148 Second, and more relevant for current purposes, that
romanticism finds ready expression in a rule forbidding
government from setting the terms of allowable speech by marking
off some topics as off-limits—that is, the content-neutrality rule.149
Nevertheless, as illustrated by the cases this Article has
discussed,150 the content-neutrality rule may not be capable of
serving as a reliable guide to deciding as many free speech cases as
the current Court seems to think. Scholars have argued powerfully
that the broad range of human communication that can serve
personal autonomy, marketplace of ideas, and even selfgovernment interests requires some trimming of the values the
First Amendment is understood to protect, lest every government
regulation of the content of speech become subject to stringent First
Amendment scrutiny.151 That trimming could take the form of
settling on one, relatively cabined, justification for free speech, a
development that would limit the categories of communication
subject to the First Amendment at all.152 Alternatively, it could take
the form of creating a hierarchy of protected speech, with speech at
148. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Live Free or Die—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78
OHIO ST. L.J. 917, 925 (2017) (“[T]he notion that the First Amendment has multiple ends,
including fostering a competitive marketplace of ideas and protecting individual autonomy
[beyond the self-governance goal the author focused on], has flourished . . . . First
Amendment pluralism, however, provides few meaningful limits on the freedom of
speech . . . . Both the metaphor of an unfettered marketplace of ideas and the emphasis on
individual expression and autonomy make it exceedingly difficult to articulate a principled
justification for denying coverage to any speech.”).
149. Of course, such romanticism could trigger very different First Amendment
doctrines. For example, a commitment to equal participation in the political marketplace
could be expressed in a rhetorical commitment to political equality that would justify speech
regulations deeply inconsistent with the current libertarian approach to the Free Speech
Clause. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (“[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”).
150. See supra Parts II–IV.
151. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech is Not “Speech,” 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839 (2017)
(arguing that such trimming is necessary given recent expansions of the First Amendment’s
scope and the increased social importance of data as a market commodity); id. at 850 (arguing
that such trimming is best accomplished by identifying self-government as “an overarching
theory of First Amendment coverage”). To be sure, it is uncontroversial that some limited
speech restrictions—for example, those applied in non-public forums—may legitimately be
content-based. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (finding a fundraising campaign taking place in federal workplaces to be a non-public
forum, and thus allowing the government to draw content-based distinctions when deciding
which non-profits may participate).
152. See generally Bhagwat, supra note 151.
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the apex accorded particularly careful protection—for example,
enjoying the protection of a strict content-neutrality requirement.
While the Court has declined to adopt the first of these
approaches,153 it has taken some steps toward the second. The
modern Court154 has subdivided the First Amendment into a
variety of speech categories and contexts, some of which are quite
specific,155 that call forth lesser judicial protection.156 That process
started with the Court’s recognition of intermediate protection for
commercial speech in 1976 and 1980, and continued through both
its recognition of government authority to “require professionals to
disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their commercial
speech,” and its statements (and doctrine) relegating sexual speech
to a lower rung of protection.157 And indeed, despite the Court’s
seeming commitment to protecting all forms of speech, it has all but
assumed that some speech restrictions simply do not implicate the
Speech Clause.158 This process of subdividing categories of

153. See id. at 850 (suggesting this failure and urging that it be corrected).
154. For a careful discussion of earlier Court statements about whether different types
of speech enjoy the same level of protection (whatever that level may have been), see
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015); id. at 2196–
97, for a commentary focusing on political speech in particular.
155. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (“[W]e deal
here with the [First Amendment] law of billboards.”).
156. See id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The Court has
upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain
persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to
perform their functions.”); id. (citing cases dealing with the First Amendment rights of
students, prisoners, soldiers, and federal employees); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (discussing setting forth forum doctrine and
noting the different rules that apply to speech in different fora) .
157. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality
opinion) (describing the scrutiny applied in Renton as “intermediate scrutiny”); City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (applying lesser First Amendment scrutiny
to laws regulating sexual speech if those laws were justified based on the so-called secondary
effects of that speech).
158. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, First Amendment Imperialism and
the Constitutionalization of Tort Law, in UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW: PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY
PAPER SERIES (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437289 (discussing tort law more
generally, and advocating that tort law remain largely outside the realm of the First
Amendment); Bhagwat, supra note 151, at 866–67 (discussing products liability claims based
on failure to warn and faulty explanation theories). Of course, the Court has also explicitly
recognized the unprotected status of the well-known Chaplinsky categories of speech, such
as obscenity and fighting words. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
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protected speech, and excluding some speech entirely from First
Amendment protection, suggests a more pragmatic, less romantic,
understanding of the free speech guarantee.159
Still, the romanticism tugs. For every pragmatic statement that
an arguably weak claim of compelled speech “trivializes the
freedom protected in Barnette[,]”160 one can find a statement that the
difference between Barnette and a different, arguably weak
compelled speech claim “is essentially one of degree.”161 Similarly,
for every statement that speech relevant to self-government stands
at the apex of First Amendment concerns,162 one can find
statements questioning courts’ ability to identify such speech163 or
their authority to accord it unusually heightened First Amendment
protection.164 While such statements could be understood as
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.” (footnote omitted)). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a municipal ordinance because it drew content-based speech
distinctions, even though the ordinance was assumed to regulate only constitutionally
“unprotected” fighting words).
159. To be sure, this more pragmatic understanding may itself flow from
understandings of why free speech is important. Those understandings may well be couched
in similarly rhetorically resonant terms. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion
moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our
duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’
exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”).
160. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc. 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)
(“Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for
a military recruiter is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing
a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or Die,’ and it trivializes the
freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest that it is.”); see also supra note 100
(explaining Barnette).
161. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
162. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The First Amendment
‘“has its fullest and most urgent application” to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office.’” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))).
163. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“The line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of th[e] basic right [to press
freedom]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one
man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2010) (“Most of what we
say to one another lacks ‘religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or
artistic value’ (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation.
Even ‘[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as fully as do
Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.’” (alterations in original) (second emphasis added)
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themselves pragmatic responses to messy realities, the Court’s
expressions of these ideas have often sounded in loftier registers.165
That romanticism lurks just below the surface of both Sorrell’s
and NIFLA’s application of the content-neutrality rule. For
example, even though the law struck down in Sorrell sought only
to prevent marketers from accessing physician prescribing
information so they could tailor the marketing pitches they made
to those same doctors, Justice Kennedy characterized the free
speech issue it presented in stark anti-paternalistic terms.166 Similar
romanticism characterized both the majority’s embrace of the

(quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971))) . Scholars have also questioned the very
coherence of a judicial pretension to identify speech that counts as relevant to selfgovernment. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670
(1990) (“The Court is most comfortable with the normative conception of ‘public concern,’
and in most instances its use of the phrase signifies that the content of the speech at issue
refers to matters that are substantively relevant to the processes of democratic selfgovernance. But it is not difficult to see why this conception of public concern would lead
directly to a doctrinal impasse. Democratic self-governance posits that the people, in their
capacity as a public, control the agenda of government. They have the power to determine
the content of public issues simply by the direction of their interests. This means that every
issue that can potentially agitate the public is also potentially relevant to democratic selfgovernance, and hence potentially of public concern. The normative conception of public
concern, insofar as it is used to exclude speech from public discourse, is thus incompatible
with the very democratic self-governance it seeks to facilitate.”). Indeed, even scholars who
advocate the Court’s identification of the self-government rationale as the sole justification
for First Amendment speech coverage acknowledge the potentially broad implications of
that rationale. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 151, at 874 (“It should be noted . . . that the word
‘political’ [as used in this context] should not be defined narrowly . . . to encompass only
speech directly related to elections or public policy issues. Scientific knowledge, cultural
sharing and development, and more broadly the shaping of values are surely highly relevant
to citizenship. More to the point, permitting the state to control the knowledge, culture, and
values of its citizens is entirely inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty that
underlies the American vision of democratic citizenship . . . . A further implication of this
insight is that speech need not be ‘public’ in the sense of directed at large audiences to fall
within the class of speech relevant to citizenship.”).
165. See, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479–80.
166. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 576 (“Speech remains protected even
when it may ‘stir people to action,’ ‘move them to tears,’ or ‘inflict great pain.’ The more
benign and, many would say, beneficial speech of pharmaceutical marketing is also entitled
to the protection of the First Amendment. If pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment
decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive. Absent circumstances far from those
presented here, the fear that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”
(quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011))). Amazingly, immediately after this
quote the Court cited for support an incitement case about core political speech. See id. (citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
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content-neutrality rule in NIFLA167 and Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in that case, the latter of which castigated California’s
alleged smug self-congratulation for, in his view, “compel[ling]
individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs
grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or
all of these.”168 Together, the romanticism of the Speech Clause’s
pro-democratic, anti-authoritarian, truth-seeking goals, when
combined with the internal logic of the content-neutrality rule and
any subconscious (or indeed, conscious) preference for economic
deregulation help explain developments this Article has recounted
up to now. They also at least suggest the Court’s future trajectory.169
VI. THE INVASION’S IMPLICATIONS
A. The Risks
Parts II–IV of this Article have sketched out both a vertical and
horizontal expansion of the content-neutrality rule, while Part V
has offered possible explanations for those phenomena. The
Court’s explicit holding in Reed expanding the definition of a
content-based law170 reflects a vertical depening of the contentneutrality rule. The horizontal, or scope, expansion in Sorrell and
NIFLA171 reflects the extension of that rule’s domain into new
doctrinal areas: commercial and compelled speech. These
expansions could significantly impact those two areas of First
Amendment law. More generally, they could undermine the
rationales for other free speech doctrines in which a rigid
application of the content-neutrality rule does not yet hold sway.

167. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court, in justification,
refers to widely accepted First Amendment goals, such as the need to protect the Nation
from laws that ‘suppress unpopular ideas or information’ or inhibit the ‘marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” (quoting id. at 2374 (majority opinion))).
168. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). NIFLA may have presented a particularly
tempting target for application of this romanticism, given that the clinics targeted by
California’s speech compulsion appeared to be closely related to one side in the ideological
debate about abortion. See id. at 2377 (majority opinion) (stating that the California law’s
unlicensed notice provision “covers a curiously narrow subset of speakers”).
169. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 761, 801–07 (2016) (predicting courts’ future path with regard to applications of the
content-neutrality rule to new forms of expression such as computer code).
170. See supra Part II.
171. See supra Parts III–IV.
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If the Court takes them seriously, Sorrell and NIFLA portend a
major expansion of the content-neutrality rule’s domain.172 The
effects of such an expansion, while not fully knowable at this
point, give reason for concern. As a doctrinal matter, the
content-neutrality rule’s applicability both to commercial speech
and compelled speech would necessarily mean that most instances
of compelled speech and/or commercial speech regulation
would be constitutionally suspect—to use NIFLA’s language,
“presumptively unconstitutional.”173 Indeed, both Sorrell’s and
NIFLA’s additional emphasis on the speaker-based focus of the
challenged laws174 makes this result all the more likely, given that
such laws, essentially by definition, single out for regulation a
particular type of business.175 Beyond the doctrinal disturbance this
phenomenon would cause, Justices Breyer’s and Kagan’s dissents
in these cases have identified how an increasingly singled-minded
focus on content neutrality in these contexts would have the
practical result of calling into question a great variety of reasonable
economic and social regulation.
Beyond these specific concerns, a more general problem with
this expansion of the content-neutrality rule’s domain is that it
devours the more context-specific aspects of commercial speech
and compelled speech doctrines. Thus, for example, this expansion
means that inquiries into whether a commercial speech regulation
reflects illegitimate information paternalism,176 or whether a speech
172. Again, while the Court has at times given such a broad application to the contentneutrality rule in previous compelled speech cases, see supra note 99, it has often declined to
rely on that rule, see supra notes 100–104. The statement in the text considers the implications
if that broad application becomes dominant in compelled speech cases and, in particular, if
that dominance is paired with a new willingness, as in Sorrell, to apply that rule to
commercial speech as well. See supra note 111 (noting “particularly acute” issues that would
arise from imposition of a strict content-neutrality rule in the combined context of compelled
commercial speech).
173. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
174. See id. at 2378 (“This Court’s precedents are deeply skeptical of laws that
‘distinguis[h] among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.’”
(alteration in original) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010))); id. (“Speakerbased laws run the risk that ‘the State has left unburdened those speakers whose messages
are in accord with its own views.’” (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552,
580 (2011))).
175. See supra note 64.
176. This Article uses the term “information paternalism” rather than simply
“paternalism” to account for the reality that, in non-speech contexts, government
paternalism is generally accepted as a legitimate justification for regulation. For an example
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compulsion requires affirmation of a particular ideological
viewpoint,177 become irrelevant once a court determines that the
law in question regulates speech based on content (or speaker
identity).178 Like the pod people in Invasion of the Body
Snatchers, First Amendment doctrine transforms from a fullyrounded and relational entity to a flattened, one-dimensional
entity, disconnected from its surroundings. As this Article has
already alluded to and as it discusses more fully in its Conclusion,
this flattening presents real reason for worry.
Reed’s rigid insistence on bringing every facially content-based
law within the domain of the content-neutrality rule’s strict
scrutiny requirement threatens to impose a similar deadening
uniformity on Speech Clause analysis. Concededly, it is difficult to
deny that a law such as Gilbert’s sign ordinance is, as a commonsense matter, “content based.” This may explain why Justices
Breyer’s and Kagan’s concurrences focused instead on what should
be the implications of a finding of content discrimination for the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Of course, abjuring automatic
application of strict scrutiny to every law labelled as content-based

of the Court’s recognition of the anti-paternalistic thrust of its commercial speech
jurisprudence, see Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 631 n.2 (1995). “There is an
obvious difference between situations in which the government acts in its own interests, or
on behalf of entities it regulates, and situations in which the government is motivated
primarily by paternalism.” Id.
177. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1997)
(upholding against a First Amendment challenge a compelled exaction to growers to fund a
marketing program, in part on the ground that the challenged marketing orders “do not
compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views”); Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure
which forces an individual, as part of his daily life—indeed constantly while his automobile
is in public view—to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State ‘invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.’” (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))). For a critique
of the Court’s doctrinal statements refusing to consider this issue in First Amendment
analysis, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of (Dis)content, 9 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 137, 146 (2015) “Th[e] current doctrine . . . [that] forbids placing higher value on
political and ideological speech than other speech is . . . bizarre.” Id.
178. So-called speaker-based discrimination also constitutes the type of circuit-breaker
that causes courts to bypass the more contextual aspects of commercial speech and
compelled speech doctrine. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346 (“[Precedent] reaffirmed
the First Amendment principle that the Government cannot restrict political speech based
on the speaker’s corporate identity.”); id. at 340 (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of
the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”).
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would effectively repeal the content-neutrality rule as it is currently
understood, in favor of a rule that considers a law’s content
discrimination as simply a factor to consider in the analysis.179 But
the Reed majority’s cursory suggestion at the end of its opinion that
some content-based sign ordinances might survive strict scrutiny180
suggests that it understood that the scrutiny it calls for, if applied
with its normal rigor, would indeed have revolutionary and deeply
troubling implications.181
B. Mitigation Strategies
None of these fundamental changes are a foregone conclusion.
For example, shortly after the Court decided Reed, a commentator
suggested that the case could be distinguished “up, down, and
sideways,”182 and thus its effect limited. Indeed, this potential
exists, at least for some types of speech regulations. First, and most
obviously, courts deciding commercial speech cases could
simply acknowledge the well-established understanding that
commercial speech regulations are, essentially by definition,
already considered content-based. Under this approach, Reed’s
application of strict scrutiny to the town’s sign ordinance has no
significance for commercial speech doctrine, which already
concedes the inherent content discrimination of the types of
regulations it governs and provides a unique doctrinal structure for
evaluating them.183

179. See supra note 47 (citing an opinion by Justice Breyer in which he calls for the
content-neutrality rule to be considered as merely a “rule of thumb”).
180. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015).
181. Indeed, one might draw a very rough analogy to the Court’s similarly quick and
unsupported statement in District of Columbia v. Heller that the majority’s embrace of an
individual rights reading of the Second Amendment did not call into doubt longstanding
restrictions on the possession of guns by certain people and in certain places. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
182. Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981,
1987 (2016) (referring to “up” in terms of courts continuing to find laws content-neutral, or
finding them content-based but satisfying strict scrutiny; “down,” in terms of construing a
regulation as regulating conduct rather than expression; and “sideways” in terms of failing
to apply Reed in the commercial speech context). This Article focuses on the first and third of
these mechanisms, given its focus on regulation of what is unambiguously speech, as
opposed to speech that could be redescribed as conduct.
183. See id. at 1991 (“Lower courts can take the Supreme Court at its word (or rather, its
silence) by distinguishing Reed sideways and continuing to evaluate challenges to
regulations of commercial speech under intermediate scrutiny.”).
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While a good number of courts have taken this approach,184 and
while scholars have suggested that this approach will limit the
impact of Reed’s expanded definition of content discrimination,185
Sorrell’s focus on the content-neutrality rule makes it risky to
believe that this trend will necessarily prevail.186 To be sure, Sorrell
is already nearly a decade old, and even relatively recent lower
court opinions have continued to resist imposing strict scrutiny on
commercial speech regulations, despite Sorrell’s implication that
they should.187 Thus, Sorrell’s effect on lower courts may remain
limited, even in light of Reed. This would hardly constitute a
surprising result, given the fact that Sorrell ultimately applied
conventional Central Hudson scrutiny188 and that lower courts are
generally reluctant to rely on inferences to conclude that the Court
has overruled old doctrine.189
184. See, e.g., Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, Inc. v. City of Cedar Park, 387 F. Supp. 3d
703, 712–13 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (declining to apply Reed to a commercial speech case); Wash.
Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 296 (D. Md. 2019) (describing a “prevailing consensus”
that Reed did not disturb doctrines calling for less-than-strict scrutiny of particular types of
content-based laws, including commercial speech regulations); CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n
v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (same); Note, supra note 182,
at 1991–92 (discussing other such cases in the commercial speech context); see also, e.g.,
Kersten v. City of Mandan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 640, 646 (D.N.D. 2019) (citing Reed to apply strict
scrutiny to a law that distinguished between commercial and non-commercial speech). But
see Ocheesee Creamery L.L.C. v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235 n.7 (11th Cir. 2017) (suggesting
uncertainty about Reed’s effect on commercial speech); GJJM Enters., L.L.C. v. City of Atlantic
City, 352 F. Supp. 3d 402, 405–06 (D.N.J. 2018) (“‘Content-based laws—those that target
speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may
be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests.’ ‘Commercial speech is no exception.’” (first quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226;
and then quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011))).
185. See, e.g., Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV.
65, 70 (2017) (“For so long as the Court continues to distinguish between commercial and
noncommercial speech . . . Reed’s reach will be inherently limited.”). The omitted clause in
this sentence concedes that whether that distinction will retain vitality constitutes “an open
question,” but nevertheless concludes that “the commercial speech doctrine is safe at least
for now.” Id. Sorrell gives reason for more pessimism than perhaps Professor Armijo
acknowledges. Indeed, later in that same article he concedes that the changing composition
of the federal judiciary could create a situation in which “Reed’s Two-Step could become the
very weapon used to blow the commercial speech doctrine away altogether.” Id. at 73.
186. See id. at 70 (acknowledging the possibility that increased judicial reluctance to
carve out commercial speech for special treatment could result in the imposition of a strict
content-neutrality requirement on commercial speech regulations).
187. See supra note 184 (citing recent cases that continue to insist on applying relatively
more deferential review to commercial speech regulations).
188. See supra note 109 (explaining Central Hudson scrutiny).
189. See infra note 197 (noting that reluctance).
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Nevertheless, one can never be too sure. NIFLA’s more recent
emphasis on the content-neutrality rule190 could portend a newfound focus on the content-neutrality rule in compelled speech
cases.191 In addition to impacting compelled speech doctrine,
NIFLA’s emphasis on the content-neutrality rule could reinforce the
implicit message sent by Sorrell (and, less directly, by Reed) that
content-neutrality should be a strictly enforced, broadly applicable
rule.192 To be sure, NIFLA’s recognition of more relaxed Zauderer
scrutiny for compelled statements of “factual, noncontroversial”
information in commercial speech193 continues to provide a carveout for a discrete category of compelled commercial speech. But the
narrow, seemingly grudging application of that carve out in NIFLA
itself194 reinforces the opinion’s overall signal favoring a generally
applicable strict scrutiny requirement for all, or nearly all, contentbased speech regulations.
Second, regarding commercial speech in particular, Sorrell
could be read as simply applying standard Central Hudson–style
scrutiny.195 In Sorrell’s concluding paragraphs, Justice Kennedy
returned to those more traditional commercial speech factors, and
explicitly reserved the question of whether a content-based
commercial speech regulation is presumptively invalid in the same
way that a content-based regulation of non-commercial speech is.196

190. It bears noting that many commercial speech cases involved speech compulsions
rather than speech restrictions, and thus implicate the analyses in both Sorrell and NIFLA.
See, e.g., Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor of Balt., No. MJG-10-760, 2016
WL 10893970, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2016) (noting that content-based speech compulsions
trigger strict scrutiny, but recognizing an exception to that rule for commercial speech).
191. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (Wilson, J., concurring) (insisting that Reed applies to a regulation of professional
speech, a subset of commercial speech regulation, at least in certain contexts); see also Wash.
Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 296 (D. Md. 2019) (finding in NIFLA a “signal” that
content-based laws “as a general matter, are suspect”).
192. See, e.g., Smith v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 837, 849 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (noting the defendant’s argument that NIFLA “stands for the principle that strict
scrutiny should apply to [the] compelled commercial speech [allegedly at issue in that
case]”). To be sure, the court in that case found the argument “unwarranted,” but only
because it concluded that the plaintiff was not seeking to compel the defendant to engage in
any particular speech. See id.
193. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
194. See id. (holding this carve-out to be inapplicable to one of the two mandated
disclosures at issue in that case).
195. See supra text accompanying note 109 (setting forth the Central Hudson test).
196. See supra text accompanying note 75; infra note 200.
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Given lower courts’ reluctance to recognize implicit but unacknowledged changes in Supreme Court doctrine,197 Sorrell’s
ambiguity raises the real possibility that, in the absence of further
word from the Justices, lower court judges will find ways to
integrate into the traditional Central Hudson framework both
Sorrell’s emphasis on the content-neutrality rule and Reed’s more
stringent definition of content-neutrality.198
Such an integration might push Central Hudson review—in
particular, its “tailoring” requirement199—in the direction of
strict(er) scrutiny,200 but would preserve the traditional framework
for commercial speech regulation.201 Alternatively, it could simply
create a sub-set of the content-neutrality rule, in which contentbased commercial speech regulations remained subject to standard
Central Hudson scrutiny, despite those regulations having been
formally identified as content-discriminatory.202 This latter

197. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 413 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t certainly is
not our role as an intermediate appellate court to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court
or even to anticipate such an overruling by the Court.”); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (agreeing with the lower court’s decision to rely on Court precedent even
when that lower court recognized the tenuousness of that precedent’s continued vitality).
198. See Mason, supra note 23, at 987–91 (suggesting how courts might incorporate Reed
into commercial speech analysis); id. at 987 (suggesting that lower courts have incorporated
Reed either by making more stringent the tailoring prong of the Central Hudson test or
simply by making the content-neutrality inquiry “a threshold question” in the Central
Hudson analysis).
199. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(asking, as the fourth prong of the commercial speech inquiry, “whether [the challenged law]
is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest”).
200. See Mason, supra note 23, at 988–89 (“Under Sorrell . . . content-based restrictions
must at least satisfy the standard Central Hudson test. What more they must satisfy is
unclear.”); id. at 978 (“[O]ne could imagine how content neutrality would aid th[e] inquiry
[into Central Hudson’s “tailoring” prong]: a content-based law seems undesirable if a contentneutral alternative would satisfy the same government objective.”). But see Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (declining to decide whether the challenged commercial
speech regulation’s content-basis justified application of “a stricter form of judicial scrutiny”
rather than “a special commercial speech inquiry” since the outcome would be the same
under either).
201. See supra text accompanying note 198 (suggesting that Reed could effectively
ratchet up Central Hudson’s “tailoring” prong).
202. See Mason, supra note 23, at 978–79 (noting how one court that incorporated Reed’s
content-neutrality analysis into the Central Hudson test did not mention the word “content”
in its analysis of Central Hudson’s tailoring prong); supra note 200 (implying that “a special
commercial speech inquiry,” presumably the one announced in Central Hudson, would
continue to apply despite the identified content discrimination of the challenged commercial
speech regulation).
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development would be both odd and unwelcome, as it would
create an additional doctrinal complexity that changes no results.
The justification for such a gratuitous complexification would be,
at best, unclear.203
Third, courts could integrate Reed into the content-neutrality
rule’s expanded horizontal application by concluding that, indeed,
commercial speech and compelled speech regulations necessarily
trigger strict scrutiny, but then finding such scrutiny to be satisfied.
Doctrinal tools exist that would allow this development. At the
most general constitutional law level, in contexts ranging from the
dormant Commerce Clause to the Equal Protection Clause the
Court has sometimes cautioned that context matters when applying
heightened scrutiny.204 In terms of commercial speech, the Court
now has over forty years of caselaw explaining the distinct
characteristics of commercial speech and why those characteristics
justify a different standard of review.205 It would not take
extraordinary creativity to incorporate that acknowledgement of
commercial speech’s distinctiveness into a jurisprudence that, as a
practical, if not formal, matter, justifies a “strict scrutiny lite”
standard for commercial speech restrictions. Analogously, the
Court’s foundational compelled speech cases have recognized the
fact- and context-sensitivity of judicial review in that area.206 Just as
with commercial speech, it would not take extraordinary creativity
to channel that sensitivity into a more deferential variant of
strict scrutiny.
203. Cf. Mason, supra note 23, at 989 (arguing that the work content-neutrality has
previously done in commercial speech cases has been accomplished via judicial disfavoring
of laws justified based on the content of the disfavored speech, and suggesting that Reed’s
facial content-discrimination standard would add little to that benefit).
204. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“Context matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”); Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (upholding a state law that concededly discriminated against
interstate commerce because the law was sufficiently narrowly tailored); id. at 144–45
(“Although the proffered justification for any local discrimination against interstate
commerce must be subjected to ‘the strictest scrutiny’, the empirical component of that
scrutiny, like any other form of factfinding, ‘is the basic responsibility of district courts,
rather than appellate courts.’” (first quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 337 (1979);
and then quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982))).
205. For a concise summary of that jurisprudence, see Lora E. Barnhart Driscoll,
Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A Rationale for Clarifying and Simplifying the
First Amendment’s Protections for Nonpolitical Advertisements, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 213, 216–
29 (2011).
206. See cases cited supra notes 103 and 104.
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But despite its ease and the existence of antecedents in other
areas of constitutional law, judicial embrace of a contextualized
version of strict scrutiny is treacherous. At the very least, it creates
confusion about the “real” meaning of strict scrutiny.207 Watering
down strict scrutiny in order to reach acceptable results in light of
that test’s expanded applicability after Reed also risks infecting
other applications of strict scrutiny where that tool is particularly
necessary to smoke out invidious favoring of certain speech or
certain viewpoints.208 Nevertheless, if the Court is going to insist on
expanding content-neutrality’s domain and depth, such a
contextualization of strict scrutiny may be its most plausible next
move as it plots that rule’s trajectory.209
C. Another Approach?
Space limitations on this Article, when combined with its focus
on identifying and critiquing the invasion of the content-neutrality
rule, preclude a comprehensive analysis of other approaches the
Court could take when reviewing speech regulations that currently
remain outside that rule’s domain. However, it bears making the
general point, consistent with this Article’s focus on the acontextual
nature of the opinions this Article has critiqued, that Speech Clause
doctrine should at least presumptively reflect awareness of the
context of the speech regulation confronting the Court in a given
case. Concepts such as content-neutrality can be exceptionally
useful, but only if they are applied with an awareness of issues such

207. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1675, 1677 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (lodging this complaint about the majority’s conclusion that a content-based state
judicial ethics canon satisfied strict scrutiny).
208. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring in
the judgment) (worrying that this phenomenon may come to pass); see also Mason, supra note
23, at 980 (discussing a post-Reed case that arguably applied a less stringent version of strict
scrutiny to content-based regulation of professional speech). But see Armijo, supra note 185,
at 82–84 (arguing that courts could in fact uphold much of the regulation that critics of Reed
have worried is newly endangered by holding that such regulation satisfies strict scrutiny,
and applauding the prospect of such a result); cf. Kagan, supra note 23, at 414 (arguing that a
rule distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions, and
applying heightened scrutiny to the former, would be a natural first step in constructing a
First Amendment doctrine that was ultimately concerned with ferreting out invidious
government intent).
209. Cf. Langvardt, supra note 169 (forecasting just such a dilution in the context
of judicial review of government regulation of new information technologies such as
3D printing).
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as the nature of the speech in question or the reasons that regulation
of such speech is potentially problematic.
For example, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his opinions in
Reed, Sorrell, and NIFLA, the ubiquity of content-based speech
regulations makes a rigid strict scrutiny requirement seriously
problematic for the modern regulatory state.210 Similarly, Justice
Kagan’s concurrence in Reed questioned whether a rigid strict
scrutiny mandate applicable to every content-based law furthered
the Speech Clause’s underlying goals as she understood them.211
As applied to the contexts explored by this Article, these
observations suggest the lack of wisdom in rigid application of a
content-neutrality rule. With regard to commercial speech, scholars
have argued that protection for commercial speech is founded on a
concern for consumer/listeners.212 Such a foundation is ill-suited to
a blanket content-neutrality rule that shifts the focus of protection
from listeners to speakers.213 That ill-suitedness becomes clear
when one remembers that the current test for commercial speech
requires that the speech in question propose a transaction that is
lawful214 and that it be truthful and non-misleading.215 Both of
these limits make perfect sense for a consumer/listener-based
regime designed to enable those listeners to participate effectively
in a regulated marketplace. But as the Court’s non-commercial

210. For one of many scholarly statements to this effect, see Piety, supra note 109, at 22.
“I remain concerned that th[e] expansive First Amendment [she described earlier in her
article] will prove to be an unworkable burden on beneficial regulation intended to protect
public health, safety, and welfare.” Id.
211. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236–37 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning
whether such a mandate furthered the goals of preserving “an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas” or preventing government from singling out speech for regulation because of hostility
or favoritism toward its message (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014))).
212. See, e.g., Piety, supra note 109, at 13 (observing that the Court’s foundational case
protecting commercial speech, Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976), rested to a significant degree on consumers’ interest in receiving accurate
commercial information).
213. See, e.g., id. at 21 (“[W]hat started out as a limited right to hear truthful
information (but not false information and without any rationale for a speaker’s right
to speak commercial information) has morphed into a right which resides primarily in
the speaker . . . .”).
214. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (providing
significant protection to a non-commercial speaker who advocates unlawful activity).
215. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (protecting untruthful speech
in a non-commercial setting).
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speech cases reveal,216 neither limit makes sense for a speakerfocused regime.217
One can find a similar ill fit in the compelled speech context.
Beginning with Barnette,218 the foundational statement of compelled
speech doctrine, the Court has often focused its compelled speech
scrutiny on whether the challenged compulsion required the
regulated party to utter a political or ideological statement with
which she disagreed.219 That focus reflects the arguably more
serious infringement on individual autonomy when government
uses an individual to express its preferred ideological message as
opposed to “merely” preventing the individual from expressing
her own.220 The increased gravity of that constitutional sin
surely turns on the ideological nature of the compelled statement.
That focus on the nature of the compelled expression is in
deep tension with NIFLA’s suggestion that any government
compulsion to speak any message defined by its content is
presumptively unconstitutional.221
216. See supra notes 214–215.
217. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising.”); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2000) (“Public discourse is where citizens attempt to render the state
responsive to their views, and hence where individual and collective self-determination is
reconciled. In such circumstances, compulsory speech disrupts the very point of public
discourse . . . . Within commercial speech, by contrast, the primary constitutional value
concerns the circulation of accurate and useful information. For the state to mandate
disclosures designed more fully and completely to convey information is thus to advance,
rather than to contradict, pertinent constitutional values.” (footnotes omitted)).
218. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635–36 (1943) (“The question
which underlies the flag salute controversy [at issue in that case] is whether such a ceremony
so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual
by official authority . . . .”).
219. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (suggesting this hierarchy of concern).
221. To be sure, NIFLA acknowledged the Court’s “precedents have applied more
deferential review to some laws that require professionals to disclose factual,
noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech.’” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372
(2018). By itself, this carve-out reflects a more contextual approach to compelled and
commercial speech regulation. Almost immediately, though, the Court limited this carve-out
to compelled disclosures of such “information about the terms under which . . . [such] services
will be available.” Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). Thus, for example, in NIFLA
itself, the Court held this carve-out inapplicable to a requirement that a family planning clinic
that did not offer abortions post information about state-provided abortion services. See id.;
cf. id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for a broader reading of this carve-out, precisely
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Such attention to context may require the Court to craft more
fact-based, nuanced Speech Clause decisions. It should hardly be
surprising that this Article would suggest such an approach, given
its general criticism of the Court’s rigidity in the cases it has
discussed. To be sure, such a suggestion is not free of risk. It is fair
to object that this approach threatens to authorize the Court to
make subjective decisions based on its idiosyncratic or motivated
reasoning-based understanding of the nature of the speech and the
speech regulation at issue. Put another way, it is fair to argue that a
strict content-neutrality rule provides a rule-based approach to
issues that, because of their importance to both individuals and
society, should be as free of judicial subjectivity as possible.222 But
the cases critiqued in this Article reveal the significant costs of
such rigid rules, as do the cases that are yet to be decided,
should the Court press forward with the content-neutrality rule’s
invasion. Like the rigidity of those rules themselves, the rigidity
with which the Court threatens to apply them raises the specter of
unacceptable costs.
VII. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
But what about those future cases and that future invasion? Is
the current invasion likely to succeed? Will other First Amendment
areas become its new targets?
A. The Current Battlefield
It is impossible to predict the Court’s future path with any
confidence. Still, with regard to commercial speech, several Justices
have expressed discontent with the more deferential Central Hudson
standard.223 If those Justices coalesce into a bloc and find the proper
vehicle, it is easy to imagine the Court solidifying Sorrell’s stillon the theory that its underlying justification was to allow government to ensure that more
commercial information be made available to consumer-listeners).
222. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 5, at 1265 (arguing that a strict content-neutrality rule
functions as “a usable norm” courts can use to discipline local officials’ tendencies to
suppress speech); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 774 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (lauding “fairly strict categorical rules” for “keep[ing]
the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for
limiting what may be said”).
223. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Robert Bork & Commercial Speech, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
615, 621 n.48 (2014) (noting this discontent).

919

001.ARAIZA_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:34 PM

2019

tentative implantation of the content-neutrality rule into the
commercial speech realm.
Doing so, however, would raise a host of questions about
commercial speech regulations that have up to now been
considered largely settled.224 For example, would full application of
standard free speech doctrine to commercial speech prevent
government from prohibiting commercial speech about a banned
product?225 Such prohibitions are unquestionably constitutional
today.226 However, they would likely be presumptively
unconstitutional under standard free speech doctrine, given
Brandenburg v. Ohio’s requirements of specific intent to incite
immediate unlawful conduct and a likelihood that the incitement
would succeed.227 Prospects such as these might cause this
incipient majority to shrink back from taking the decisive step
of formally enshrining the invasion begun in Sorrell. Or they
may persuade the Court simply to retain the shell of the Central
Hudson test while ratcheting up the scrutiny associated with the
“fit” prong of that test. Similarly, recognition of the myriad means

224. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s view
[that strict scrutiny applies to a content-based disclosure law], if taken literally, could
radically change prior law, perhaps placing much securities law or consumer protection law
at constitutional risk, depending on how broadly its exceptions are interpreted.”).
225. Cf. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (“[I]t is
precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the
underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of
allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.”).
Posadas has been heavily criticized and has been all but overruled. See 44 Liquormart v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509–10 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“Given our longstanding
hostility to commercial speech regulation [that seeks to dampen demand for a legal product],
Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose suppression
over a less speech-restrictive policy. The Posadas majority’s conclusion on that point cannot
be reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations
on truthful, nonmisleading advertising when non-speech-related alternatives were
available.”); id. at 518, 531 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Since Posadas, . . . this Court has examined more searchingly
the State’s professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to further it, before
accepting a State’s claim that the speech restriction satisfies First Amendment scrutiny.”).
226. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63
(1980) (providing as the first element of the current commercial speech test the requirement
that the speech refer to legal goods or services).
227. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (imposing these
requirements for incitement liability). Most commercial speech would likely fail those
immediacy and likelihood requirements.
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by which government compels speech in innocuous ways228 might
persuade the Court to retain its more relaxed stance toward “health
and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual
and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products,”229
despite that stance’s uneasy fit with the formalities of the contentneutrality rule.
B. New Beachheads?
Regardless of its decisions on the commercial speech and
compelled speech issues, the Court may strike out in search of new
territory ripe for an invasion by the content-neutrality rule. After
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, scholars, perhaps prompted by Justice
Kagan’s dissent,230 immediately noticed the inconsistency between
Reed’s holding that facial content-discrimination triggers strict
scrutiny and the Court’s secondary effects doctrine, which
228. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing examples of
such regulations).
229. Id. at 2376 (majority opinion). In recent years the D.C. Circuit has issued opinions
expressing a variety of views about the applicability of Zauderer’s standard. In National
Association of Manufacturers v. SEC (National Association I), 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d
on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), a panel of that court declined to apply Zauderer’s more
deferential standard to an SEC rule requiring disclosure of manufacturers’ use of so-called
conflict minerals, reasoning that Zauderer did not apply because the challenged rule did not
aim at combatting consumer deception. See id. at 370–71. After that opinion, the full D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, applied Zauderer to a disclosure requirement that was justified by
interests other than combatting consumer deception. Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t. of Agric., 760
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); id. at 22 (“The language with which Zauderer justified its
approach . . . sweeps far more broadly than the interest in remedying deception. . . . All told,
Zauderer’s characterization of the speaker’s interest in opposing forced disclosure of such
information as ‘minimal’ seems inherently applicable beyond the problem of
deception . . . .”). After the en banc decision in American Meat, the panel in National
Association of Manufacturers reaffirmed its prior decision (despite that earlier decision being
explicitly overruled by the en banc court in American Meat, see Am. Meat, 760 F.3d at 22–23).
National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC (National Association II), 800 F.3d 518 (D. C.
Cir. 2015). National Association II based its decision in part on the ground that the conflict
minerals rule failed Zauderer review because the government failed to demonstrate how the
rule furthered the government’s stated interest. See id. at 527 (“[W]hether [the statute on
which the rule was based] will work is not proven to the degree required under the First
Amendment to compel speech.”). It also suggested, more speculatively, that the required
disclosure was not “purely factual and uncontroversial.” See id. (quoting Am. Meat, 760 F.3d
at 27); id. at 528–30 (applying the purely factual and uncontroversial standard to the
disclosure challenged in that case).
230. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a law that was facially content-based)).
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subjected laws regulating the location of sexual speech outlets to
what the Court itself called the “intermediate scrutiny”231
appropriate for content-neutral speech restrictions.232 Of course, the
foundational secondary effects case, City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, was able to label such laws content-neutral only because it
defined as content-neutral those laws that “are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”233 The tension
between Renton and Reed is obvious. It is a fascinating question
whether the Court that produced Reed will see that expanded
definition of content discrimination to its logical endpoint if that
endpoint is a strip club or adult theater.234
231. See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48 (setting forth more deferential standard for
reviewing such types of regulation). Scholars have already begun to discuss the implications
of Reed for secondary effects doctrine. See Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign
Regulation After Reed: Suggestions for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 URB. LAW. 569, 598
(2015) (“The secondary effects doctrine is at odds with both the Reed majority’s ‘on its face’
rule and the concerns about limiting disfavored messages underlying that rule. On that
ground it seems a likely candidate to be revisited in the near future.”); Anthony Lauriello,
Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1140–41 (2016)
(“[A]fter Reed it is still an open question if the secondary-effects doctrine remains relevant in
determining content-based speech regulations.”).
232. Indeed, when the Playtime Theatres Court rejected the theater’s argument that the
city’s ordinance was under-inclusive because “it fails to regulate other kinds of adult
businesses that are likely to produce secondary effects similar to those produced by” the
regulated theaters, Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 52, the Court cited a canonical equal
protection rational basis case, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1955), for
the proposition that the Court could not assume that the city would not amend its ordinance
to reach “other kinds of adult businesses that have been shown to produce the same kinds
of secondary effects as adult theaters.” Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 52–53. The citation to
Lee Optical suggests that secondary effects review, at least under the Playtime Theatres regime,
involves scrutiny even more deferential than that suggested by the “intermediate scrutiny”
label. To be sure, scholars have argued that at least one post–Playtime Theaters appellate case
instituted a somewhat more stringent test for secondary effects regulation. See Daniel R.
Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger, & James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law
of Secondary Effects is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741, 746–
47 (2009). But see id. at 748–51 (explaining how that later test has sometimes been applied
very deferentially by one federal circuit).
233. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
234. To be sure, of the Justices that joined the Court’s most recent application of
traditional secondary effects doctrine, only Justice Thomas remains on the Court. Compare
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2223 (identifying the Justices joining the majority opinion) with City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 428 (2002) (identifying the Justices who joined the
plurality opinion’s traditionally deferential application of secondary effects review). Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Souter’s opinion which offered a less-deferential
approach to secondary effects analysis that nevertheless reflected more deference to
government regulation than would be expected under traditional free speech doctrine. See
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That endpoint might also be a professional office.235 In NIFLA,
the Court expressed doubt about a broad “professional speech”
exception to the content-neutrality rule.236 To be sure, the Court
acknowledged the line of cases resting on Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel,237 in which the Court used a relatively relaxed
standard of scrutiny238 to review compelled commercial disclosures
of “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms
under which [the speaker-offeror’s] services will be available.”239
Nevertheless, the Court read the subject of Zauderer-governed
speech restrictions narrowly. In NIFLA, the Court, speaking
through Justice Thomas, distinguished Zauderer on the ground that
the posting required by California’s licensed notice law addressed
services the state itself offered, rather than services offered by the
clinics that were the subject of the regulation. Or so the majority
concluded, despite the fact that, as Justice Breyer noted in dissent,
the compelled speech (about state-financed abortion services) was
closely related to the non-abortion pregnancy services the speaker
offered.240 Justice Breyer also insisted that Zauderer should be read
more broadly than the majority did, given that case’s focus on the

Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 453 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Thus,
the way might be clear for the Court to import the content-neutrality rule into the secondary
effects doctrine and thus essentially subsume that doctrine entirely within the standard
approach. For a consideration of Reed’s impact on secondary effects regulation, see Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 57
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 385 (2017).
235. See Haupt, supra note 5, at 151 (describing “a new form of aggressive content
neutrality . . . on the rise in First Amendment jurisprudence” and describing its application
to regulations of the speech of professionals).
236. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–72 (2018).
237. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
238. See id. at 651 (reviewing compelled disclosures of the type at issue in that case
to ensure that they “are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception
of consumers”).
239. Id.
240. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]nformation about state
resources for family planning, prenatal care, and abortion is related to the services that
licensed clinics [which were the subjects of the speech compulsion] provide. . . . The required
disclosure is related to the clinic’s services because it provides information about state
resources for the very same services.” (emphasis in original)).
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interests of listeners (the targets of professional speech)241—a focus
that he argued justified that broader reading of Zauderer’s scope.242
Going beyond the Thomas-Breyer debate in NIFLA about the
proper reading of Zauderer, the developments this Article has
recounted raise questions about the future viability of Zauderer,
even narrowly read. Sorrell’s and NIFLA’s incorporation of the
content-neutrality rule into, respectively, commercial speech and
compelled speech doctrine243 render anomalous a rule, like
Zauderer’s, that allows content-based commercial speech
compulsions based on the factual and uncontroversial nature of the
speech. Simply put, Zauderer’s distinction between compulsions of
factual, uncontroversial speech and compulsions of ideological
viewpoints244 becomes more difficult to sustain in a regime
governed by a strict content-neutrality rule, especially when that
rule, in turn, defines content-neutrality as formalistically as Reed
does.245 Of course, Zauderer’s distinctions fit easily within a
doctrinal structure that considers whether the speech compulsion
forces the target to affirm a political or ideological position.246 But
it is precisely this regime that is threatened by both the horizontal
expansion of the content-neutrality rule into new domains and the
deepening of that rule via Reed’s more stringent definition of
content-neutrality.
If the Court does take the steps contemplated above, and
expands the (newly-stringent) content-neutrality rule into these
additional domains,247 then it will have accomplished a revolution
241. See id. (“In Zauderer, the Court emphasized the reason that the First Amendment
protects commercial speech at all: ‘the value to consumers of the information such speech
provides.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)).
242. See id. (“[T]his [listener-focused] rationale is not in any way tied to advertisements
about a professional’s own services.”).
243. See supra Parts III and IV (discussing these points, respectively, in the contexts of
Sorrell and NIFLA).
244. On the importance of viewpoint, rather than content discrimination, as the most
important consideration in determining the constitutionality of speech compulsions, see
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2388–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting), in which Justice Breyer suggested that
the clinics in NIFLA would have had a stronger compelled speech claim if they had
developed a viewpoint discrimination argument in the lower court.
245. See supra Part II (discussing this point in the context of Reed).
246. See cases cited supra note 104 (focusing on whether the challenged law forced the
speaker to utter ideas about politics or ideology).
247. Other domains also exist as possible targets for this expansion. The two trademark
registration cases the Court has recently decided on First Amendment grounds—Iancu v.
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) and Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)—relied on the
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in First Amendment law.248 It will have succeeded in applying
standard First Amendment doctrine to types of speech that for
decades have been exempted from that doctrine’s default rules.249
Any suggestion that such a development indicates a healthy
doctrinal standardization or harmonization should not mislead: on
the contrary, it would be unfortunate. Those exemptions from
standard First Amendment doctrine exist for a reason. The First
Amendment protects commercial speech for reasons that really do
differ from the reasons it protects other types of speech.250 If the
Court does not believe this, then it will have to adjust its doctrine
allowing the government to ban commercial speech advocating
illegal transactions, in order to account for the latitude such
advocacy enjoys in non-commercial contexts. For their part,
compelled speech regulations really are ubiquitous: strict
application of a facially defined content-neutrality requirement
would indeed call into question a variety of innocuous speech

viewpoint discrimination inherent in the trademark registration prohibitions the Court
struck down. But other trademark registration restrictions, such as the prohibition on
registering “the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or
municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof,” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2018),
are best understood as content, but not viewpoint, based. Whether such restrictions therefore
comport with the First Amendment, or whether by contrast they are invalid based on the
content-neutrality rule, is a question the Court has so far left undecided.
248. See, e.g., Lakier, supra note 5, at 235 (“Reed . . . represents an important change in
First Amendment doctrine, and one that will in all likelihood have a significant impact in
many areas of law.”).
249. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding a
compelled speech subsidy and distinguishing unconstitutional speech subsidies in part
based on the ideological nature of the speech they compelled); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995) (describing review under Central Hudson as “intermediate
scrutiny);” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573
(1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking
down a speech compulsion, largely based on the constitutional objection to government
compulsion of ideological speech); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (applying a proto-secondary effects doctrine to sexual speech a decade before a
majority in Playtime Theatres solidified that approach).
250. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides . . . .”). For
scholarly explanations of why commercial speech is a distinct category of speech, see for
example, Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV.
372 (1979); Post, supra note 217. This is not to underplay the difficulties of identifying
“commercial speech” as a species of speech different from more generally protected speech.
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 638–48 (1990) (explaining the definitional difficulty).
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compulsions. Other current exceptions from the content-neutrality
rule, such as Zauderer, reflect similarly important social interests.
These realities would force a Court promoting the expansion of
the content-neutrality rule to choose among several unpalatable
alternatives. It could water down the resulting strict scrutiny, thus
creating confusion among litigants and lower courts and rendering
that tool less useful as inherently strong medicine.251 Alternatively,
it could bite the bullet and strike down such reasonable or
innocuous laws, thus trivializing First Amendment protections and
endangering common-sense regulations that pose no threat to
foundational First Amendment values.252 Finally, it could create ad
hoc exceptions to the rule it had just crafted, with all the mischief
such ad hockery creates.253
If the Court acts on these expansionist possibilities, then the
content-neutrality rule’s conquest will be complete.254 In that
case we will be left with a free speech doctrine bereft of contextsensitivity, one that lumbers through the pages of case
reporters with scarcely a nod at nuance255—a doctrine that, to quote
251. Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categorical rules
keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for
limiting what may be said.”).
252. See supra note 160.
253. Indeed, Justice Breyer accused the NIFLA majority’s carve out for “health and
safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial
disclosures about commercial products,” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018), as just such an
ad hoc exception creating this sort of mischief. See id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The
majority . . . adds a general disclaimer. It says that it does not ‘question the legality of health
and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial
disclosures about commercial products.’ Ante, at 2376. But this generally phrased disclaimer
would seem more likely to invite litigation than to provide needed limitation and
clarification. The majority, for example, does not explain why the Act here, which is justified
in part by health and safety considerations, does not fall within its ‘health’ category. Ante, at
2375. Nor does the majority opinion offer any reasoned basis that might help apply its
disclaimer for distinguishing lawful from unlawful disclosures. In the absence of a reasoned
explanation of the disclaimer’s meaning and rationale, the disclaimer is unlikely to withdraw
the invitation to litigation that the majority’s general broad ‘content-based’ test issues. That
test invites courts around the Nation to apply an unpredictable First Amendment to ordinary
social and economic regulation, striking down disclosure laws that judges may disfavor,
while upholding others, all without grounding their decisions in reasoned principle.”).
254. Recall that the content-neutrality rule applies even to government regulation of
unprotected speech. See supra note 28.
255. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV.
L. REV. F. 165, 181–82 (2015) (“First Amendment doctrine is plural. There is no single
structure of First Amendment doctrine. . . . Different kinds of speech embody different
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one description of the “pod people” from Invasion of the Body
Snatchers, is “devoid of all human emotion.”256 As a doctrinal
structure overseeing governmental power over that most human
of activities—speech—that would be a truly ironic and
unfortunate result.257

constitutional values, and each kind of speech should receive constitutional protections
appropriate to the value it embodies. . . . [S]ubject[ing] all speech to a single set of rules can
lead only to doctrinal chaos.”).
256. Invasion of the Body Snatchers, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Invasion_of_the_Body_Snatchers (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
257. Cf. Note, supra note 182, at 1999 (“In [Reed], the Court elevated its concern for rulebound doctrine over sensitivity to facts on the ground and the purposes underlying
enhanced First Amendment protection.”).
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